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INTRODUCTION
Statement of the problem. The problem of this thesis is to
draw a comparison between formal logic, as formulated by Aristotle, and
the logic of Hegel, It is to be a comparison of the Hegelian logic of
development as over against the static nature of Aristotelian logic. We
are not, however, attempting to deal critically with either logical sys-
tem as this would be a task far beyond the scope of this thesis. The
thesis is to be a comparative study of both logical systems in so far as
their general presuppositions and conclusions are concerned.
The thesis, in the main, will concern itself with those areas
in Hegelian logic which either: (1) offer a principle in opposition to
those of Aristotelian logic; (2) adopt an Aristotelian principle; or
(3) present an advance over an Aristotelian principle while using that
principle as a basis for the reasoning employed and the advance made.
Such questions as, What is the relation of Hegelian and Aristotelian
logic? and, Does Hegelian logic furnish us with any new insight or
principle by which we may attain truth? will be kept in mind throughout
the study.
It is frankly admitted that the main interest in this study is
to acquire an understanding of Hegel* s logic in its applications to the
science of reasoning. Interest in this subject was aroused because of
the fact that Hegel 1 s logic is at once said to be discouragingly diffi-
cult to comprehend and at the same time to have had an immeasurable in-
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fluence upon the thinking of subsequent philosophers. The general est-
imate of Hegel* s logic has, in general, exhibited this contradictory
character. The difficulty seems to lie in the metaphysical implications
of Hegel's thought. But the question has arisen, If Hegel's logic is as
difficult as it is claimed to be and yet has had such a profound in-
fluence upon the thinking of those who followed him, are there not some
outstanding principles which Hegel has demonstrated and which can be
understood as valid apart from the general metaphysical system of which
they are a part? If so, what is the relationship of these principles to
those that are commonly taught in the science of formal logic? The
resulting study is an attempt to answer some of these questions.
Loewenberg, in his Hegel Selections, opens his introduction in
these words:
Hegel is a philosopher whom one neglects at
one's peril. His learning was vast, his discern-
ment keen, his penetration deep. He had a syn-
optic mind, and his vision was synoptic. ...Hegel
thought he had provided a system sufficiently
spacious to include in it in sublimated form all
the typical ways of responding to the world and
all the typical categories by which to describe
it. The truth is the whole, he said, and his
philosophy, he claimed, was the whole truth.
...The very extravagance with which Hegel pro-
claimed the truth of his philosophy is a challenge
to the prevailing neglect of it. The tenets
associated with his name, though their preten-
tiousness be offensive, may well be worth our
knowing.
1
Of all the great philosophers of history, Hegel is perhaps the
most criticized, and for the most varying of reasons. The charge is
1. Loewenberg, HS, ix.
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3brought against him that he is dense, and therefore difficult to under-
stand. Such a criticism tells one only the extent of the critic's under-
standing or lack of it, and very little about Hegel. Others do not like
Hegel's Absolute; others shy away from the union of logic and metaphysics.
Hegel has been championed on the one hand by those who believed him to be
a champion of Christianity; he has been criticized, on the other hand, by
those Christians who have charged that his philosophy leads to atheism, or
at the very least, to pantheism. Hegel has been accused of destroying
the individuality of the human person, and of exalting the Prussian State.
He has been accused of being entirely too abstract and rationalistic and
his philosophy too far removed from the facts of everyday experience.
All such charges and accusations show a lack of understanding of Hegel on
the part of his critics, for when his philosophy is rightly understood,
it is seen to be rooted in experience, and to exalt personality.
The basis of many of these criticisms lies in the fact that Hegel
is typically German, and his philosophy is expressed in characteristically
difficult language. In addition, Hegel constantly uses terms in current
use with new meanings attached to them; consequently part of the prepa-
ration of anyone who would study him is a mastering of his peculiar
terminology. This, in itself, has occasioned much criticism, but
such criticism has no more validity than a criticism of the terminology
of modern scientific medicine would have. No science or philosophy can
hope to make a searching study of experience without the use of termin-
2. Cf. Royce's important article on Hegelian terminology in
Baldwin, DPP, 454-464.

ology that will be unambiguous and will carry the meaning that is in-
tended, and no other.
It is to be admitted that Hegel is difficult, and that his
language is a barrier to an understanding of him; but the real difficulty
lies in the fact that his approach to the reality of life and the world
is so searching and comprehensive in its scope that it is disturbing to
people who are so bound within ordinary habits of mind that they are
content if they can express themselves with a minor degree of exactitude, l|
Wallace has summed up the real issue in his Prolegomena to Hegel f s Logic
,
in which he says,
Perhaps the main hindrance in the way of
clear vision is the contrast which the Hegelian
philosophy offers to our ordinary habits of mind.
Generally speaking, we rest contented if we can
get tolerably near our object, and form a general
picture of it to set before ourselves. ...For most
of us the place of exact thought is supplied by
metaphors and pictures, by mental images, and
figures generalized from the senses. And thus it
happens that, when we come upon a single precise
and definite statement, neither exceeding nor
falling short in its meaning, we are thrown out
of our reckoning.
3
The main difficulty, then, in our understanding of Hegel comes,
not from the density of the man himself, but from our ordinary habits of
shallow and superficial thinking. And resentment is born when we are
forced to explain ideas and conceptions which lie outside the pale of
colorless and inadequate notions. In the same passage with the above,
Wallace refers to Rosenkranz's Hegels Leben in which Hegel himself is
quoted as saying, "The condemnation which a great man lays upon the
3. Wallace, PSHP, 2-3. Cf. Hegel, Sncyclopfldie (Wallace), 7-8.

world, is to force it to explain him",'* It is hoped that a comparison
of Hegel's logic with that of Aristotle will in some measure help us to
explain him.
The literature. Research has disclosed that, as far as we were
able to determine, there is no work specifically designed to draw the
comparisons we are suggesting, Im many of the standard works on Hegel
there are, of course, many references to such comparisons. We have
therefore not relied upon any one work as a basis for this thesis, but
have appealed to the standard works on both Hegel and Aristotle. Mich
reliance has been placed upon the Organ on of Aristotle and upon the
Bncyclopadie of Hegel, since the comparisons we are looking for are best
found in the primary works of these men apart from the interpretations
which usually accompany commentaries upon them.
The method. The method followed is clearly indicated by the
structure of the thesis. We begin with a historical survey of logic in
order that we may determine the origin and development of the science of
logic, and also the relationship of the distinctively Aristotelian logic
to logic as it has been developed through the history of philosophic
thought. The treatment of the history of logic makes necessary some ref-
erence to its modern applications and methods, and this has been done with
a view toward presenting general impressions rather than comprehensive
4. Wallace, PSHP, 1.
r1
expositions* The place of Hegel*s logic in the general scheme of the
history of logic is also noted*
Chapter two deals with Aristotelian logic, both with reference to
its origin and nature, and also with reference to its main problem and
consequent limitations. Effort is made to give a clear account of its
general presuppositions and its main principles.
Chapters three and four deal with Hegelian logic in a similar
vein. Hegel's logic is examined with reference to its historical
connections and significance. This is followed by an examination of its
general presuppositions and main principles.
Chapter five is a comparison and contrast of the two types of
logic, based upon the studies made in the preceding chapters.
At this point it is necessary to call attention to a tendency
which develops as we go deeper into the study: the tendency to confuse
the logic as formulated by Aristotle with the more modern adaptations of
it, as, for example, symbolic logic. No attempt is made to deal with
symbolic or mathematical logic other than to include it in the historical
survey of logic. But it should be emphasized that the formal logic of
Aristotle became formalized and divorced from reality by revisions made of
it after Aristotle's death. The comparison before us is based upon the
logic of Aristotle, not upon modern adaptations of it. This fact needs to
be kept in mind, especially in dealing with the criticisms that Hegel
levels against formal logic, for often quite evidently he has in mind the
more modern adaptations of it, and all of his criticisms do not necess-
arily apply to Aristotle's formulation of it.
c
CHAPTER ONB
THB EISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC
Aristotle is famous in the history of human thought because he
attempted to organize and systematize all of the various branches of
knowledge which his day and age possessed, Ei3 achievements in such an
undertaking are, to say the least, astounding. He exhibits a depth of
thought, a breadth of knowledge, and an analytic ability that probably
has never been equaled since his day. Along with his work in the various
sciences, it is not unnatural that his mind should turn toward the nature
of thought itself, and toward those processes of thought which everyone
must use if he is to arrive at truth. Consequently, Aristotle turned his
attention toward what today is known as formal logic.
Before examining Aristotle* s contribution to the science of
logic, it is well to recognize that Aristotle was not the first thinker
to turn his attention toward the problem of clarifying thought. Logic
arose, at least for the western world, in the golden age of Greek specu-
lation, which culminated in Plato and Aristotle. According to Wolf and
Blunt:
There is an Indian logic, it is true, but
its priority is still disputed. In any case, no
influence upon Greek thought can be shown. The
movement which ends in the logic of Aristotle is
self-contained.l
1. Bnc. Brit . , XT7, 316. In general* the survey of the history of
logic which follows is based upon this article (307-330).
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,
4 *" *> I
t
C
c
*
Logic needs as its presuppositions that thought should disting-
uish itself from things and from sense, that the problem of validity-
should be recognized as properly belonging to the field of thought itself,
and that analysis of the structure of thought should be recognized as the
one way of solution. The first stage of Greek philosophy possessed only
the potentiality or germ of logic. The early nature-philosophers Thales,
Anaximander, and Anaximenes (600-528 B.C.), in seeking for a single,
material principle underlying the multiplicity of phenomena, raised the
problem of the one and the many; and any endeavor to find the solution to
this problem must eventually lead to logic. 3ut only from the point of
view of later speculation can these early philosophers be said to have
sought to determine the predicates of reality. A further step in the
movement toward a definition of logic was necessary, and this step was
taken by the Eleatics when they opposed their thought to the thought of
others as being the way of truth in contrast to the way of opinion.
Zeno, "the dialectical Sleatic" (c. 490-430 3.C.) has been regarded as the
"discoverer" of dialectic, for he attempted to strengthen fileatic
doctrines involving the underlying unity of reality by showing that their
difficulties for common sense are matched by difficulties equally great
for those who believe in multiplicity and change. Aad he does this by
the logical device of taking his opponents* position as a premise, and
showing that this leads either to two opposite conclusions that contra-
dict one another, or else to a reductio ad absurdum. One meaning of the
term "dialectic" today is the showing of contradictions in experience.
Vt
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The Sophists (450-400 B.C.) made a further contribution to the
development of logic. The Sophistic age may he designated as the age of
loose thought, and the contribution of the Sophists to logic lies in
their development of the art of argumentative discussion. They were
probably more interested in instructing than in demonstrating, so that
they were content with persuasion rather than rational conviction. 2 They
began with customary opinions accepted without criticism, and held with-
out clearness. To this type of reasoning Aristotle gave the name "dia-
lectic": reasoning "from opinions that are generally accepted". 3 These
men were aware that, in a sense, anything could be debated; yet at the
same time they were not aware of the fact that there are principles of
the structure of thought which determine and limit the movement of
thought itself. In this sense all things cannot be debated. The
Sophists, however, furthered the transition from free thought to logic
proper in two ways:
(1) They made logic possible. Their incessant questioning and
hairsplitting led to distinctions of value. Their paradoxical insistence
upon the accidents of speech-forms and thought-forms led inevitably in
the end to a perception of the essentials of those forms.
(2) They made logic necessary. The spirit of debate run riot
evoked a counter-spirit to order and control it. The result was a self-
limiting dialectic, and this higher dialectic is a logic. The first of
the philosophical Sophists, Gorgias (483-375 B.C.), raises issues which
2. Stebbing, MIL, 477.
3. Aristotle, Tppica
,
I, 100a, 25.
-
are as much logical and epistemological as they are ontological. Hie
meaning of the copula and the relation of thoughts to objects of which
they are thoughts are as much involved as the nature of being. The
problems raised by the relativism of Protagoras (484-411 B.C.) are no
less fundamentally problems of the nature of knowledge and of the
structure of thought.
But it remained for Socrates (470-399 B.C.) to establish the
real basis for logic as we know it today. Grote says of him:
Sokrates was the first who broke ground for
Logic - for testing the difference between good
and bad ratiocination. He did this by enquiry
as to the definition of general terms and by the
dialectical exposure of the ignorance generally
prevalent among those who familiarly used them.
Socrates made a lasting contribution to the science of formal
reasoning. His was the initial development of argument by the question
and answer method (the famous "socratic method") and by his painful ex-
traction of definitions from the muddled and contradictory nature of the
common opinions of his contemporaries. By his constant endeavors to
limit or define his concepts he at least fostered logic and prepared the
way for its being set up as an independent philosophical concern. From
his attempts at definition, Socrates went on to what is now called in-
duction, which in his case was a form of questionnaire in which he made
an effort to elicit a consensus of opinion from which a generalization
might be drawn. Aristotle gives Socrates credit for the elaboration of
4. Grote, ARI, 426.
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til© two logical functions of general definition and inductive method. 5
Socrates gives no theory of either, but uses them with a practical end in
Q
view without any attempt to systematize them into a logical instrument.
A further development of logic in principle was made by Plato
(427-347 B.C.), who utilized the methods of Socrates and also tackled
many problems of method and attempted to discover proper heads of class-
ification by which the complexity of facts might be made to yield to
correct meanings and interpretations, Especially is this true in the so-
called "Socratic" dialogues of Plato, such as Apology, Crito, Protagoras,
Mono, Gorgias, etc., in which he follows the same negative procedure as
Socrates, exposing many examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology.
Plato*s most remarkable contribution is without a doubt the principle
that our success in reasoning depends upon the degree to which we are
able to co-ordinate systematically all the relevant facts of our exper-
ience, within and without, into an ordered and harmonious system.'
An interesting study of Plato's logic, if it may be properly
5. Aristotle, MET, xii, 4, 1078b. By "induction", Aristotle means
deduction, for the method Of Socrates was modeled on mathematical demon-
stration (see Plato's Meno, where a geometrical demonstration is stated
to be knowledge). He persuaded his contemporaries to venture a def-
inition, and then he criticized that definition. This method "is
essentially deductive for it is by drawing or deducing the consequences
of the definition that it is shown to be justified or the reverse"; Dubs,
PJ, 51.
6. It is interesting to note that in many of the Socratic dialogues
of Plato,s no final definition of the subject in question is ever
arrived at.
7. Warbeke, SMG, 277.
f
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termed logic, has been made by Lutoslawski, in his The Origin and Growth
Of Plato's Logico This writer holds that Plato was the first man in the
history of human thought who may be properly called a logician, although
he qualifies his statement by saying "at least /he is the^ first logician
whose writings have reached us in a form as complete as they were known
Q
to his contemporaries". He distinguishes between an earlier stage,
which he designates as the "Socratic stage", and a later stage in the
logic of Plato, The Socratic stage is held to be probable because we
know from Aristotle* s Ivletaphysics that Plato owed to Socrates the tendency
to form exact definitions of ethical notions. This tendency to form
exact definitions is especially noticeable in the shorter dialogues, and
in the Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, and Gorgias, four works in which
Socrates is represented as triumphant over the Sophists. All have in
common a predominating ethical aim, and they deal with the definition of
virtue and the various parts of virtue, as well as with the question as
to whether or not virtue, like knowledge, can be taught. In all of them,
however, logical questions, as such, are only lightly touched upon. 9
In the Protagoras, in discussing knowledge and how to arrive at
it, Plato states the principle that each notion has only one contradictors
to itself, and he gives examples of this rule without, however, making
any distinction between contradictory and contrary terms.^ In the Mono,
8. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 3.
9. Of the shorter dialogues, only five are important for an in-
vestigation of the development of Plato's logic, viz., Euthypro, Apology,
Crito, Laches, and Gharmidea; Lutoslawski, OGPL, 196.
10. In the tenth book of the Republic, Plato formulates the law of
contradiction as a law of thought.
r
¥

Plato makes a careful distinction between particular and general affirm-
ations. It is in this dialogue that Plato first lays down his rule of
"dialectic" ; a requirement that all who wish to discuss dialectically
must base their reasoning upon recognized notions or premises. For both
Socrates and Plato the great antithesis was between Dialectic and
Rhetoric:
...interchange of short question and answer
before a select audience as contrasted with long
continuous speech addressed to a miscellaneous
crowd with known established sentiments and opin-
ions, in the view of persuading them on some given
interesting point requiring decision.^
As a method of verifying doubtful propositions, Plato proposes
to look for consequences from certain hypotheses set up prior to a dis-
cussion; a method which he describes as an "hypothetical argument". 12
But other than these few scattered instances, Plato makes no attempt to
13
classify them as principles of reasoning.
But the rules of dialectical discussion enabled Plato to attain
a degree of certitude never before approached. Starting from recognized
11. Grote, ARI, 263.
12. Plato, DP (Jowett), I, 262.
13. It is interesting to note Plato's conception of knowledge in
the three dialogues Sophist
,
Pollticus , and Philebus . In these dialogues
Plato develops the classification of notions. Knowledge ceases to be
pure intuition, and becomes the product of thought as a co-ordinating
agency. This activity of thought has produced the existing order in the
material universe, and our human thought is but a reproduction of the
more perfect divine thought. Classification and co-ordination, analysis
and synthesis, are the two powerful instruments of inquiry. Soul and
movement are the ultimate explanation of everything that takes place.
Here Plato anticipates Hegel, and Hegel borrows from him.
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premises, dividing and distinguishing notions, following up the con-
sequences of each hypothesis, and avoiding all unjustifiable generaliz-
ations, Plato set up
...an ideal of infallible knowledge, far above
traditional opinions, and he distinguishes this
scientific knowledge from common belief by his
ability to show a reason for each assertion. The
methodic connection of thought gave to his con-
clusions a permanence and consistency which un-
scientific opinion never reaches. 4
This logical method was first applied to the questions un-
successfully attacked in his earlier writings, and in the Gorgias Plato
produced a consistent theory of virtue and of the aims of life.
But although Socrates to a lesser extent, and Plato to a
greater extent dealt with the problem of the consistency of thought, it
remained for Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) to be the first to work out, in any
comprehensive way, the processes of thought in order to discover and
systematize the specific conditions and laws of correct procedure which
must be the minimum ground for valid reasoning. He for the first time
specifically segregates the problem of reasonableness (cogency of
thought as such) from the psychological descriptions of how the mind acts,
as well as from the metaphysical problem of the ultimate nature of
reason or the mind.
In this brief historical survey of the development of the
science of logic, we will simply mention Aristotle as the founder of the
systematic science, leaving an evaluation and criticism of his contrib-
ution to a following chapter.
14. LutOslawski, OGPL, 216-217.
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Aristotle is the father of logic as a formal science, and he
founded the science of logic when he realized the importance of the form
of a proposition and was led thereby to the recognition that all deductioi
is formal. Since his day, "traditional" logic has been that which does
not go beyond the logical doctrines of Aristotle but contents itself with
an elaboration of its technical details. Common to all "traditional"
logicians is the acceptance of the subject-predicate doctrine of the
traditional Aristotelian schedule of propositions and the restriction of
deduction to the syllogistic form. The logic as formulated by Aristotle
about 530 B.C. persisted as the backbone of logical analysis up to the
middle of the 19th century.
In the subsequent development of logic, in so far as the
Aristotelian framework of the science was accepted, that development is
limited to minor corrections and extensions of a formal kind. Aristotle
laid down the structure that the rest of the history of logic carried out.
Even the great philosopher Kant (1724-1304) treated technical logic in a
wholly traditional manner, and his contribution to formal logic is, in
itself, negligible. Kant*s system has, however, an important relation-
ship to Hegel*s logic, and it will be dealt with in a following chapter.
The development of modern logic has taken, in general, two
forms. The first of these is the development of a generalized, or pure,
logic; a logic which is purely symbolic and mathematical. Traditionally,
the syllogism has been treated as a form of argument; i.e., as an
attempt to demonstrate that a certain proposition (the conclusion) is
true because some other propositions (the premises) are true. As such,
V
r
•
? 5
4
16
1 the syllogism is not concerned with the truth, or falsity, of the con-
clusion, or of the premises, but only with the validity of the reasoning,
which depends upon the form alone. In this sense, Aristotle*s logic is
a logic of form, and his theory of the syllogism is the earliest attempt
to exhibit the purely formal principles of deduction. As a logical
principle, it suffers from three main defects: (1) its restriction to a
single mode of deduction, the syllogism; (2) its failure to symbolize
the relations involved in the premises of the syllogism; and (3) its
defective analysis of these relations. Since the logical analysis of the
syllogism is purely formal, the form can just as well be expressed by
substituting symbols for words. The usual example of a syllogism:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore Socrates is mortal
is not a logically simple form. The traditional syllogistic logic does
not assert the conclusion, but only the fact that the premises jointly
involve the conclusion as a necessary result. To be correct, then, the
syllogism should be stated in the form: If all men are mortal, and Soc-
rates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. It is obvious that the valid-
ity of the reasoning does not depend upon the fact that Socrates is
mentioned. It would do just as well is we substituted Plato, Spinoza,
Hitler, or any other individual, for Socrates, What we are asserting is
a relation between "being a man" and "being mortal", and this can just as
well be denoted by algebraic symbols as by words, for words themselves
are only symbols. This purely formal character of syllogistic reasoning
c*
17
1
1
has given rise to the modern school of symbolic or mathematical logic.
Since the syllogism is completely formal, there is no necessary refer-
ence to any given reality; any terms may be exchanged for any others in
a syllogism with no danger to the validity of its conclusions. The im-
plication, therefore, can be asserted concerning anything that can be
fitted into the form. "The ideal of the logician is complete generality;
15he attains this ideal by making his assertions completely formal".
Leibniz (1646-1716) was the first to conceive, although he did
not perfect, a wider logic in which, as ordinary language imitates on
paper words representing objects, there would be a symbolic language
every character of which would stand for a simple concept. These symbols
would constitute an "alphabet of human thought" correspinding to all
possible simple ideas, and these simple ideas would be primitive concepts
out of which more complex concepts could be constructed by using the sym-
bolic language as a calculus of reasoning, like an algebra. Leibniz
failed to influence logic to any great extent because he never published
his works on these subjects. The foundations of the science of symbolic
logic were laid by George 3oole (1815-1864), who conceived and developed
a symbolic system whose significance is independent of its interpretation.
That is, it is a logic which is not restricted to any definite series of
forms, like the syllogism, but is applicable to all kinds of propositions
or problems which can be conceived and stated. It is a logic in which
idea-symbols are substituted for sound symbols, and thinking becomes a
15. Stebbing, MIL, 165.
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process of relating terms in equations, irrespective of the subject
matter to which those terms may apply. Thus, it is adapted for use in
modern physical science where the scientist is interested mainly in the
abstract relations which obtain in the field of mathematics. Such logic
is also used in realistic ontology, in which the ultimate world is a
sphere of neutral entities or a world of mere is-ness; and the science
which describes this world and its relations is the logic of abstract,
mathematical symbolism. In this logic, therefore, the symbols express
certain necessary logical relations which can be interpreted and applied
to reality in any number of ways 0 This new logic has been further dev-
eloped by the contemporary philosophers, Whitehead and Russell, who have
shown that all of mathematics is equivalent to pure logic. D
The second form in which modern logic has developed is the
science of inductive logic. The development of logic as purely symbolic
ends in the conception of abstract deductive systems that must be inter-
preted if they are to be regarded as applying to the existent world. The
sciences other than mathematics are concerned with the discovery of
generalizations and with the establishment of comprehensive theories
capable of verification in experience. The method whereby this is done
is called "scientific method", and also "inductive logic".
It is to be noted that Aristotle not only discovered the form of
deductive inference, but that he also saw the problem that it presented:
the problem of the truth of ultimate premises. For Aristotle, scientific
16. For a fuller treatment of symbolic logic, see Stebbing, MIL,
478-487. Stebbing* s entire work is written from the standpoint of
modern symbolic logic.
•
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demonstration is absolute demonstration; and he recognized the fact that
if his conclusions were to have the character of absolute demonstration,
they must logically follow from absolute premises. Scientific knowledge,
in a narrow sense, is, for Aristotle, the deduction of the particular
from the general. The problem of every proof is the deduction of the
conditioned from its grounds in which knowledge as such consists. The
hypotheses of a proof must therefore consist of necessary propositions of
general validity. A proof is only complete and absolute when what has to
be proved has been deduced from its first hypothesis through all the
intermediate stages. Such a deduction would not be possible if the hy-
potheses from which it is derived must be, in their turn, deduced from
something further, and so on ad infinitum. In other words, absolute
demonstration is impossible if an infinite number of stages lie between
the hypotheses and what must be deduced from them; we become lost in the
infinite regress. Deduction can only be accomplished when there is a
finite number of prosyllogisms. All mediate knowledge, therefore, pre-
supposes an immediate knowledge. There must be ultimate principles or
premises which cannot be demonstrated simply because they are ultimate;
principles beyond which it is entirely irrational to look. Just as the
facts of experience are known to us directly, through perception,
Aristotle recognizes in the reason of man a power of immediate, direct,
and consequently error-free knowledge of the most general principles.^
17. Aristotle did not consider the problem whether these principles
are merely formal, or whether ideas of definite content, like the idea of
God, can be known in this way. The principle of intuitive, immediate,
knowledge Opens up a whole area of epistemological investigation. The
principle is attacked particularly by Hegel.
5«
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He therefore based Ms ultimate principles upon a special faculty, an
intuitive power, nous , or reason, which he held provides the immediate
major premises that are perceived in experience or by enumeration. 1®
Aristotle nowhere gives a list of ultimate principles but merely
states the one principle he considers the most certain of all: the law of
19
non-contradiction. He deduces nothing from it, but does "show that the
laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle are involved in the making
20
of any significant assertion whatever".
But it is one thing to hold to immediate intuition of ultimate
principles, and quite another to validate the conviction. Having reached
this point in his reasoning, Aristotle was still confronted by a further
problem: If there are ultimate principles, or premises, wherein does
their validity lie? The scientific basis for his immediate principles
Aristotle finds in induction, which confirms a general statement by
showing its actual validity in all the particular cases to which it
refers. Since Aristotle is forced to admit that complete observation of
every particular case is impossible, he therefore utilizes the procedure
of Socrates. He takes as a basis of his induction those hypotheses
which from the number or authority of their supporters would seem to have
been derived from experience, and endeavors to reach correct determin-
ations by a dialectical comparison and testing of these hypotheses.
18. Cf. F.C.S. Schiller, FL, 235.
19. Aristotle, MET, 17, 1005b.
20. Dubs, RI, 59; Aristotle, MET, IV, ii.

Definition, therefore, in the Aristotelian system, rests partly on de-
ductive proof and partly on immediate knowledge which receives confirm-
ation by means of an inductive process. For validating ultimate premises,
Aristotle invented what has since been called induction by complete
enumeration, or perfect enumeration. A proposition is shown to hold of
each member of a group, and hence of the group as a whole. But his
treatment of induction was in the main cursory, and he aimed only at
finding a secure basis for his deductive logic which he assumed was fund-
amental to all reasoning. He utilized induction, not to find truth, but
to substantiate his pre-conceived method of reasoning. In some cases,
principles are based upon only one instance from experience, and the
logical system of Aristotle has been open to much criticism at this point.
From Aristotle down through the Scholastics of the Liiddle Ages, deduction
was the only method of determining truth.
The Renaissance in 3urope saw the protests of Francis Bacon
(1561-1626) in the interests of scientific experimentation, and of John
Locke (1632-1704), who leveled against Aristotle the famous jibe, "God
has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures,
and left it to Aristotle to make them rational". 21 The development of
modern thought was motivated by scientific aspirations which could no
longer be satisfied with the verbal explanations of the scholastic logic.
The trend was away from the barren manner of syllogizing to the concrete
facts of experience. The question faced by science became: Can the
21. Locke, Essay
,
IY, xvii, 4 (Fraser, II, 391).

ordinary facta of experience lead us to generalizations which can be con-
sidered true with respect to reality? Thus arose the tendency, which
appears on the horizon with the advent of modern science, to proceed in-
ductively from the particular to the general. Science, in the modern
sense of the term, is based upon the inductive process of reasoning. 22
Bacon held that, in order to arrive at generally valid knowledge, we must
compare particular observations or experiments and take into account not
only similarities (as in the case of Aristotle's "simple enumeration 1*)
,
but also negative instances, "This method, however, does not yet quite
correspond to the experimental thinking employed in modern physics" .23
Bacon gives evidence of an insufficient insight into the value of quant-
itative determination, and he fails to grasp the full significance of the
function of hypotheses and the importance which they assume through the
use of mathematics. Having defined his famous "Idols" (fallacies of
reasoning), he says, in Aphorism xxxvi: "One method of delivery remains
to us, which is simply this: we must lead men to the particulars them-
selves, and their series and order; while men on their side must force
themselves for a while to lay their notions by and begin to familiarize
themselves with facts". 2^ Bacon objected rightly to the over-emphasis
of deduction as a method of attaining truth, but he did not foresee the
extent to which knowledge could be increased by the use of reasonable
22. It should be pointed out that deduction is a constituent part
of the inductive process.
23. Ehriques, HDL, 48.
24. Frost, MP, 183.
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1 hypotheses. He remained behind the ideas which contemporary scientists,
like Kepler (1571-1630) and Galileo (1564-1642), realized. Bacon's was a
"pseudo-induction" according to Snriques, for Bacon himself made no ob-
servations or experiments to substantiate it, and he advocated the schol-
astic method of discovering the simple qualities of things, the things
themselves then following from these properties by composition. 25
"Bacon was contented to develop a method of discovery, and leave to
others its utilization"
•
26 For him the great instrument to under-
standing is the abandonment of random discovery for deliberate research.
John Locke (1632-1704), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and David
Hume (1711-1776), as leaders of the movement known as the "Enlightenment",
contributed to the development of modern inductive logic by their em-
phasis upon what is known as "empiricism". By this term is meant the
belief that "the original source of all our information about the outside
world is sensation, although sense data can and should be analyzed, inter-
preted, and criticized by the reason". 27 The most important work, how-
ever, was done in the 19th century by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who
sought to systematize inductive logic as Aristotle had systematized de-
ductive logic. He began where Bacon had left off, and not only system-
atized methods of induction, but he included in his treatment the em-
phasis upon experimentation which Bacon had recommended but had not
developed.
25. Enriques, HDL, 49.
26. Fuller, HP, II, 50.
27. Wright, BMP, 140.

The result of Mill's work is the statement of certain "Methods"
of inductive reasoning which are today basic to all scientific investi-
gation. These methods he divided into four groups, each of which, as we
shall see a little later, contributes some particular advantage to
scientific investigation: (1) The Method of Agreement; (2) the Method of
Difference; and the Indirect Method of Difference, or what he terms the
28
"Joint Method of Agreement and Difference"; (3) the Method of Residues;
and (4) the Method of Concomitant Variations, Mill speaks of these
methods as follows:
The four methods which it has now been
attempted to describe, are the only possible
modes of experimental inquiry - of direct in-
duction a posteriori , as distinguished from
deduction; ...these, then, with such assist-
ance as can be obtained from deduction, com-
pose the available resources of the human mind
for ascertaining the laws of the succession of
phenomenal
In these methods, Mill stresses the importance of experimentation.
He enlarges upon Bacon's rule of varying the circumstances : "This is,
indeed, only the first rule of physical inquiry, and not, as some have
thought, the sole rule; but it is the foundation of all the rest" , gQ
For the purpose of varying the circumstances, we have recourse either to
observation of experiment - we may either find an instance in nature
suited to our purposes, or, by an artificial arrangement of circumstances,
make one. Mil draws no logical distinction between the two processes
28. Mill, SOL, 278.
29. Ibid., 291. See his entire treatment of the methods, 278-291.
30. Ibid., 273 (italics mine).

of investigation, but he does point out that the latter, experimentation,
is an immense extension of the former, from a practical point of view:
It ^experiment/ not only enables us to
produce a much greater number of variations
in the circumstances than nature spontaneously
offers, but also, in thousands of cases, to
produce the precise sort of variation which we
are in want of for discovering the law of the
phenomenon.
Burtt, in discussing Mill's methods, emphasizes the fact that
none of these is a "method"; "their role is rather to direct one's
choice of appropriate methods when investigating evidence for inductive
32
conclusions" • He speaks of them as being "principles " that are fund-
amental in guiding the process of causal induction - "the process, that
is, which issues if successful in the establishment of universal laws on
the basis of a sample composed of selected instances of the conjunctions
in question", 33
The logical significance of these principles lies in their
correction of the high percentage of inadequacy under the method of
simple enumeration . The investigator who has recognized the part played
in investigation by the influence of the factors of recency and vividness
in generalization is on the way toward true scientific knowledge, but he
may still fall prey to errors of popular generalization which factual
science has in a large measure uncovered and rendered unnecessary.
31. Mill, SOL, 274.
32. Burtt, RT, 318.
33. Ibid., 317.

The principles of agreement and difference take into account not
only the observable instances from which a generalization may be drawn,
but also the exceptions to those generalizations. Unless a generalization
has been formed with a conscious recognition of these exceptions, no
universal law can be set up, for the conjunction of the events that have
been observed might have been the result of chance, or it might have
taken place under certain specific conditions in which the law holds
good. Thus, the principles guiding the verification of scientific hy-
potheses are aimed at determining the dependable causal conditions and
contexts which operate in the conjunctions observed. Scientific in-
vestigation, therefore, aims specifically at attempting to puncture its
own hypotheses I Only a hypothesis which has shown itself able to stand
the test of systematic and unfriendly investigation can be safely affirmed
as a verified scientific law. .anything legs than such a procedure in-
volves the danger of having an assumed universal law overthrown by more
extensive observation of a given phenomenon.
To illustrate the immense significance of experiment in Mill's
logic of induction we have need to note only the difference between the
operation of his Method of Agreement and his Method of Difference. Burtt
gives the Method of Agreement as follows:
The conjunction of two phenomena may be
affirmed as a causal law if every observed in-
stance of one is followed or preceded in its
proper context by an instance of the other,
no exception having occurred in any of the
varied circumstances under which it occurs in
that context. 34
26
34. Burtt, RT, 323.
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This method consists simply in the observation of certain events
which result consistently whenever certain conditions are present. For
example, one eats mushrooms and becomes violently ill. If it is noted
that every time mushrooms are eaten, violent illness results, a con-
junction between the eating of mushrooms and the resultant illness can be
inferred. But the necessity to go beyond the simple method of agreement
(which is only slightly better than mere enumeration) is seen in the fact
that, in the example given above, it is quite possible that there is a
second factor present in the context which we have not discovered and
which is the real cause of the illness. In other words, what we need to
do is to establish the fact that only the mushrooms are the cause of the
illness, or, to express the idea differently, we need to replace the
many-one relationship given by the method of agreement with the one-one
relationship which is possible with the method of difference.
The Method of Difference is stated by Burtt as follows:
The conjunction of two phenomena may be
affirmed as a one-one causal law if the occurr-
ence of one, in its proper context, is always
followed or preceded by the appearance of the
other, and its non- occurrence under circum-
stances otherwise similar to those in which it
occurs, by the non-appearance of the other.^5
With the principle of difference experiment under controlled
conditions comes in. Experiment may, it is true, be used when one is
being guided merely by the principle of agreement, but it is of dis-
tinctive value when the principle of difference is being used. To the
35* Burtt, RT, 328.
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question, What is the essence of scientific experimentation? Surtt
answers:
It consists in artificial manipulation of
phenomena, so that they or the parts into which
they can be analyzed may be added or removed one
by one, enabling the experimenter to observe
precisely what happens in the presence or absence
of each, and with much less likelihood that un-
noticed factors are betraying his calculations.
With experiment, a thinker definitely passes from
a mode of verification which does not involve
more than systematic observation, with no special
tools to aid him, of what is happening in the
world apart from his interference, to modes which
do depend upon his interference, ^-nd there is a
significant difference between a situation in
which one is simply watching carefully what Nature
is doing already, and a situation in which he
actively manipulates objects so as to force her
to engage in performances which apart from such
manipulation, would rarely occur, if ever, or to
omit performances that would otherwise take place 36
As soon as scientific inquirers learned how to introduce active
experimentation in a systematic way, every branch of knowledge increased
by leaps and bounds to undreamed of achievement. In so far as experiment
can be carried out systematically, it compels any exception to a hypo-
thesized law to present itself if it exists, Experiment forces Nature to
reveal her secrets without the scientist being forced to wait until she
spontaneously produces the condition or the situation he desires to
study, and such secrets can be examined sometimes at times and places
that are convenient for us. Many conditions occur very rarely in Nature
without our interference, and others, though they occur spontaneously,
36, Burtt, RT, 329.

they do so in ways which do not permit detailed analysis and measure-
ment.
3 "^
It should be noted that in modern science the concept of prog-
ress has taken the place of the ideal of a demonstrative science based
upon immutable principles which thus make science itself immutable. The
ideal of science today may be stated to be an hypothesis which brings
together with the least amount of distortion and the most clarity the
whole of human experience. It is not enough merely to describe events as
they take place; what science is in need of is an explanation of how
events take place with a view toward determining the extent to which they
may be expected to take place in the future. Science consists in the
systematic relating of events, spatio-temp orally, to other events which
are concomitant with them, whose occurrence would lead us to expect the
former. Explanatory truth is not expected to be absolute; science is
satisfied if a conjunction of events can be demonstrated. As Burtt
says:
Anything is explained when it is viewed as
one member of a class of similar events, and
when another class of events has been found to
be regularly conjoined with it in this way.38
37. See Burtt, 316-341, for an explanation of causal laws and the
methods of modern scientific experimentation; see also, 511-540, where
he discusses completely the application of inductive procedures part-
icularly in the fields of psychology, sociology, and other social
sciences, where accurate results are especially difficult to obtain.
38. Burtt, RT. 229.

A given event is considered to be adequately explained (at
least for scientific purposes) if it can be dependably predicted with
respect to its further occurrence. Such an explanation is based upon
two postulates which are themselves not absolute principles but hypo-
theses which have been proved by long experience to be dependable:
(1) The postulate of predictive uniformity ; which affirms that
if B was followed by A in the past, the same conjunction will hold in the
future* Or, stated negatively (which is just as imp ortant ) , an absence
of uniformity in the past will hold for the future also,
(2) The postulate of causality ; which carries the postulate of
uniformity farther than the mere prediction of events in the future to
the principle that every event in the world has specifiable causes.
On the basis of these two postulates, and by the use of the in-
ductive methods of Mill, plus the methods of hypothesis and experiment-
ation, science arrives at probable truth. Scientific constructions,
therefore, are based not so much upon first principles which are immed-
iately suggested by simple observations as upon principles which always
follow as consequences from the preceding scientific development. "For
what we deduce from provisionally accepted hypotheses leads through ex-
perimental verification to their criticism and renovation". 057
Modern inductive logic, therefore, is limited in the sense that
it is never capable of yielding general principles whose certainty is so
established that they stand in no need of verification. In addition, it
39. Bnriques, HDL, 51.
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is impossible to verify the consequences of an hypothesis or a principle
independently of the acceptance of other hypotheses. Inductive logic,
purely as such, has given way to a system of theories in which the con-
struction, demonstration, and evolution of systems of concepts represent-
ing various orders of phenomena are dealt with. Scientific induction, or
the scientific method of research, may be outlined somewhat as follows:
(1) Location and Definition of Problem
Observation
Notation
Co-ordination of related facts
(2) Formulation of an Explanatory Hypothesis or Mechanism
(Solution of Problem)
Deduction
(3) Testing or Verification of Hypothesis
Bxperimentati on
(4) Growth (revision of old hypothesis or the substitution
of a new one, in which latter case the whole
method is repeated)
From this process, science arrives at a generalization and its
aim is to extend this generalization to other areas of the phenomenal
world. This it does by a uniting of deductive and inductive methods of
logical inquiry. The conclusion of modern logic is that the proper pro-
cedure in scientific investigation is a combination of both the inductive
(hypothetical) and deductive methods.4^ The relation of deduction to
induction is a necessary one because our search for facts has often led
into experimentation which a little insight into general principles
would have shown to be futile. Aristotle*s advice to make induction and
31
40. See Mill, SOL, 156, where he notes the function of formal logic
as auxiliary to the logic of truth (induction). The logic of consistency
is recognized as a valuable and necessary part of the logic of truth
because what is inconsistent with itself cannot be true.
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deduction reciprocal, testing our conclusions by particular cases as well
as by general principles is followed in scientific method today. The
development of a theory into a more and more comprehensive system of
knowledge is made possible "only by the union of exact mathematical de-
41duction and accurate observation". The union of deduction and in-
duction is shown in Newton's correction of the Keplerian laws of plane-
tary motion. Having deduced the calculation of central forces from the
laws of Kepler, which were the result of long astronomical observations
(induction), he generalized the hypothesis by assuming the universality
of the attraction between material masses.
Thus the concept of knowledge from the point of view of modern
inductive logic has changed from that of absolute demonstration to that
of probability. Science gives no absolute certainty; all we can hope
for is a high degree of probability. It is well to remember what Bn-
riques so adequately says:
Deduction brought to full light thus appears
as a means for correcting hypothetical premises,
that is, as a proper instrument of induction. The
new conception of science as historical removes the
stumbling-block of the ancients: the dilemma between
the impossibility of demonstrative science and the
necessity of indubitable principles. Science is
regarded now as cumulative, as a progress of sys-
tems or deductive theories gradually coming nearer
to reality, each growing out of the preceding and
erecting its consequences into more and more gen-
eral principles.
41. Stebbing, MIL, 492.
42. Enriques, HDL, 96.
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1 The chief point of interest to us in this survey of the dev-
tlopment of logic is the fact that, as far as syllogistic logic is con-
cerned, it has remained essentially the same as it was when Aristotle had
finished a systematization of its principles for the first time. That
Aristotle*s logic is today the basis of the common formal or syllogistic
reasoning has been well expressed by Fuller, when he says:
Aristotle. ••produced a Logic that not only
is the first systematic work of its kind in
European philosophy, but also, after some
twenty-four hundred years, still ranks as an
all-important contribution to the subject.
Indeed, no work of his, unless perhaps it be
his Ethics , has had so great and so permanent
an influence upon later thought.43
In many of the histories of logic, Hegel* s logic is not treated
as a logic, but as a metaphysics, and therefore usually receives but a
I bare mention. Hegel held that logic has a double identity: it is ex-
planatory of the forms of thought, and at the same time an exposition of
the principles of being. Logic is, according to Hegel, the system of
pure reason, or the Absolute Idea in the abstract element of its being.
In his logic, he brings in the chief definitions of formal logic, but he
submits them to a transformation according to the demands of his dia-
lectical method, and at the same time giving them an objective signifi-
cance. But his logic is a true logic for it purports to be an expos-
ition of the movement of human or finite thought as well as of .absolute
Reason, and the principles upon which it is based have a direct bearing
43. Fuller, HGEP, III, 162.
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upon the logical processes of reasoning. Thus, Baillie and Wallace say
of it:
The logic of Hegel is the only rival to the
logic of Aristotle. What Aristotle did for demon-
strative reasoning, Hegel attempted to do for the
whole of knowledge. His logic is an enumeration
of the forms or categories by which our experience
exists. ...The fact which ordinary thought ignores,
and of which ordinary logic therefore provides no
account, is the presence of gradation and continuity
in the world. The general terms of language simplify
the universe by reducing its variety of individuals
to a few forms, none of which exists simply and
perfectly. The method of the understanding is to
divide and then give a separate reality to what is
thus distinguished. It is part of Hegel*s plan to
remedy this one-sided character of thought, by
laying bare the gradations of ideas. He lays
special stress on the point that abstract ideas
when held in their abstraction are almost inter-
changeable with their opposites - that extremes
meet, and that in every true and concrete idea
there is a coincidence of opposites.
...The merit of Hegel is to have indicated and
to a large extent displayed, the filiation and
mutual limitation of our forms of thought; to have
arranged them in the order of their comparative
capacity to give a satisfactory expression to truth
in the totality of its relations. 44
The logic, therefore, over against which Hegel placed his own
new conception of logic is the pure logic of consistency of Aristotle,
The following chapter will be concerned with an evaluation and criticism
of Aristotle^ contribution to the science of formal logic.
)
44. Bnc. Brit., XI, 382-383.
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)CHAPTER TflO
THE PROBLEM AND LIMITATIONS OF SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC
Aristotle's logical treatises fall into three main divisions :1
(1) The Analytica Priora, in which Aristotle deals with what he regards
as common to all reasoning, the syllogism, and which aims at an exhibi-
tion of its formal varieties irrespective of the nature of the subject
matter dealt with. This portion of his logic comprises his formal logic,
or the logic of consistency, (2) The Analytica Poster! ora, in which
Aristotle discusses the further characteristics which reasoning must have
if it is to be not only self-consistent, but in the full sense scientific
as well. This portion of his logic deals, not with mere consistency, but
with truth as such. (3) The Topica and De Sophisticis Elenchis, 2 in
which Aristotle considers those modes of reasoning which are syllogist-
ically correct, but which fail to satisfy one or more of the laws of
scientific thought. The Categoriae and the De Interpretatione, which
deal, roughly speaking, with the term and the proposition respectively,
may be considered as preliminary. What is to be noted here is the fact
that Aristotle composed these various works separately, without indicating
that they belonged together as an aggregate, and without grouping them in
a single department under a single name.
1. Ross, ARI, 20-21,
2. This short treatise belongs to the Topica as its concluding book,
although generally known as an individual treatise with a separate title.
3. Hamilton, LML, II, 19; Grote, ARI, 56.
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Aristotle divides the sciences into three distinct groups or
classifications: the theoretical, the practical, and the productive. 4
The general aim of each division is knowledge, but each division is
specifically aimed at, respectively, knowledge, conduct, and the making
of useful or beautiful objects. The theoretical division, which aims at
knowledge as such, deals with intelligence alone in so far as intelli-
gence has to do with the apprehension of principles, causes, and con-
stituent elements. But the point to be noted here is that logic, as a
science, remains outside of this classification, for, according to Ari-
stotle, logic is not a substantive science, but a part of the general
culture which everyone should absorb before he undertakes to study any
science; that which alone will enable him to know which of his propos-
itions demand proof, and what kind of proof is demanded in any given
instance. 5
Having produced his logical works as separate treatises, it was
left for Aristotle's followers to group these treatises under the title
of Organon (the Instrument , that is, of knowledge) 6 and from it there
gradually emerged a system of logic. The production of Aristotle's log-
4. Ross, ARI, 20; Aristotle, MET, V.
5. That Aristotle makes this statement in so many words is not
certain. This statement represents what his method of dealing with the
subject implies as to his estimation of it.
6. Andronicus, the earliest known editor of Aristotle's works, "con-
sidered these treatises, taken collectively, to be not so much a part of
philosophy as an Organ on or instrument, the use of which must be
acquired by the reader before he became competent to grasp or comprehend
philosophy"; Grote, ARI, 55. Andronicus Rhodius (of Rhodes) was a Peri-
patetic philosopher who collected, revised, and arranged the works of
Aristotle about 80 B.C. He is said to have invented the term "meta-
physics". None of his works are extant.
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ical treatises as relatively self-contained treatises accounts for the
absence of a precise definition of their field of inquiry. Wolf and Blunt
say of Aristotle's logic:
Aristotle gave no clear intimation of the
place this field of inquiry was to hold in re-
lation to the other disciplines. In his defi-
nite classification of the sciences it hs no
place. The logical inquiry seems to be con-
ceived as dealing with the thought of which the
objects are objects. It is to be regarded as a
propaedeutic which is not concerned directly with
object-reality, but with the determination for
the thinking subject of what constitutes the
knowledge correlative to being, 7
The term "logic" as it is applied to the science today was un-
known to Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, the oldest commentator on
the works of Aristotle known to us, was the first writer to use
a
in the sense in which it is used today, Aristotle's name for the
science was "Analytics", by which he referred "primarily to the analysis
of reasoning into the figures of the syllogism, or perhaps even to the
analysis of the syllogism into propositions, and of propositions into
terms", in other words, Aristotle's logic is essentially analytic; it
is a logic of classes.
The word }>oy bKft is derived from the word ^oyoS , which had a
twofold meaning in the Greek, It denoted both thought, and its express-
ion in language, Aristotle, in order to contradistinguish ^tfycs , mean-
7, Bnc. Brit
., XIV, 318.
8, Hamilton, D.4L, II, 4. Alexander of Aphrodisias, sumamed Bxe-
getes (the "Expounder") was a celebrated philosopher and commentator on
Aristotle who flourished in the early part of the 3rd century A.D.
9, Ross, AHI, 22.
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ing thought, from Aoyo£>
,
meaning speech, calls the former -rovr &<Tco
or Tox £YTh (^i;V»1 '• that within, that in the mind; while he calls
the latter r«Y e^d : that without. This ambiguity of the word
passed into its derivative }*>yc«r\ - , and this ambiguity has exerted an
influence on the views held in regard to the ultimate purpose or object
of the science down through the history of philosophy.^-0
The most ancient name for what is now called logic is dialectic.
This word, dl/Oi^vKTikjr) » is derived from the Greek verb dw^eyz<y<SbiC/ »
meaning to hold conversation or discourse together; and the word dialec-
tic therefore signifies, literally, conversation, controversy, or dis-
pute. Plato applied the term not merely to the process of logical in-
ference, but also to metaphysical speculation.il The opinion is gen-
erally held that Aristotle restricts the meaning of the word dialectic to
a particular and applied part of logic, not to the science as a whole.
He applies it purely to the logic of probability, and it is thus equi-
ne
valent in meaning to what he designates as Topica.*
The greater number of Aristotle's logical writings have perished,
and those we have in our possession exhibit to us only his view of the
science considered in its parts, or in certain of its special relations.
None of the treatises now included in the Organon considers the science
from a central point of view. There is some ground for believing that in
10. Hamilton, LML, II, 5.
11. Hegel has applied the same term to metaphysical speculation
alone.
IE. Hamilton, IML, II, 6.
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those writings of Aristotle now lost, the sphere of logic was developed
much more comprehensively than the comparatively few treatises which we
possess would seem to indicate* The result has been that logicians have
allowed Aristotle* s view of the partial relations of logic to influence
their conception of the science as a whole. Logic, on the basis of the
few logical writings of Aristotle that have come down to us, has been
considered to be a science of the form and not the matter of thought; in
other words, it has been held that the object of logic is the formal laws
of thought in the sense that it is interested mainly in conceptions,
judgments, and reasonings, not as they are in themselves, but only as
they are as regulators of thought. The same view can be traced down
through the Kantian view of logic, and becomes one of the criticisms whict
Hegel leveled against it.
The sum of the whole matter is this: Aristotle himself did not
define the sphere of logic. On the basis of those writings of his which
we possess, it may be said that logic is the science of the pure form of
reasoning.
We have seen how the processes of reasoning were recognized by
Socrates and Plato to have some sort of laws according to which they
operate, but these men gave expression to some of these principles with-
out in any way attempting any logical analysis of them. They did make
some contribution in the matter of definition and classification, but
nothing in the way of a systematic formulation of laws was made by them.
Having associated with Plato, and being the possessor of the rich heri-
tage handed down from Socrates and a keen, analytical mind, it is small
tc
5
t
wonder that Aristotle should feel led to reflect upon the character and
principles of the mental processes by means of which he arrived at his
conclusions in other fields of knowledge. With him, the way in which
truth could be obtained was fully as much of a problem as the questions
arising in any of the sciences. Thought, merely as thought, constituted
a problem for Aristotle.
Now the only way thoughts could be expressed was in language.
Thoughts were crystallized in language which had a grammar and could be
expressed in nouns, verbs, adverbs, adjectives, and other parts of
speech. What would be more natural than to look for the existence of
the laws of thought as somehow related to language? Thus Fuller ex-
presses this same idea, when he says:
His arguments, both with himself and
others, had to be carried on along hard and
fast lines from which there could be no dev-
iation if his conclusions were to carry weight.
Behind these grammatical and forensic necess-
ities there must be an inflexible structure
of some sort which thinking was obliged to
embody if it was to make sense and to present
the truth. 13
Since this was true, what would be more logical to suppose than
that there is a "grammar" governing correct thinking which the grammar of
language follows and expresses? Thus arose the problem of the laws by
which truth could be obtained. That problem, viewed in the light of the
systematic body of his results, may be expressed thus: What are the un-
changeable principles governing all reasoning, and how can they be sys-
13. Fuller, HGP, 16B-163.
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tematized into a compact body of knowledge capable of guiding us in
determining the truth or falsity of our judgments? This is the problem
faced in Aristotle f s logic, and the logic itself gives us the answer to
this problem, and nothing more. All we have in syllogistic logic is the
science of the form of valid reasoning; syllogistic logic is analytical,
14
formal, and abstract.
Thus, a modern definition of syllogistic logic emphasizes the
purely formal aspect of the science; for example, the definition pro-
vided by Baton in his General Logic :
Logic is the science that exhibits all the
relationships permitting valid inferences that
hold between various kinds of propositions con-
sidered merely in respect to their form.^5
It is from Aristotle*s restriction of himself to this problem
that certain limitations of his logic emerge, and in taking up these
limitations, it will be seen that they are involved with certain pre-
suppositions which underlie his treatment of the subject.
To begin with, Aristotle* s work in logic was an entirely new
thing; he had nothing upon which to base his logical system except the
results of his own genius. When he was writing in the field of rhetoric,
all he had to do was to enlarge upon pre-existing suggestions, for there
were not only masters who taught the subject but also writers who theo-
rized about it. When it came to logic, however, nothing whatever had
14. Cf, Chapter V, where it is demonstrated that this terminology
is not to be taken absolutely.
15. Eaton, GL, 8.
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been done in a systematic way. The teachers and theorizers of the rhet-
orical dialogue of the day had nothing of particular merit to offer, and
what they did have was unsystematic and sometimes downright misleading.
And so Aristotle could claim originality in dealing with the subject.
I
6
What he produced was the result of his own labors according to his own
method. Thus, Aristotle himself says,
In regard to the process of syllogizing,
I found positively nothing said before me; I
had to work it out for myself by long and
laborious research.^'
Aristotle began this laborious research by tackling simple, un-
combined terms, and as a result of his analysis he performed a profound
service to philosophy by making the first distinction between univocal
and equivocal terms to which were assigned definite, technical names.
From simple, uncombined terms he moved on to propositions in which these
terms were combined, and applied his method of analysis to them. It is
in connection with his analysis of propositions that he made his first
great contribution to the science of logic. In treating the categories
of thought and distinguishing between predicates which can be predicated
of a subject and those which can be predicated iii a subject, Aristotle
42
16. Note the closing chapter of the Sophisticis Blenchis in which
Aristotle expressly and emphatically asserts his claim to originality as a
theorist on logic, and declares himself to have worked out even the first
beginnings of 3uch theory by laborious application of the method of
analysis. See the interesting discussion of this matter in Grote, ARI,
418-421.
17. The translation is that of Grote, ARI, 263.
18. Aristotle's names are syn onymous and homonymous
,
respectively.
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made one very important observation respecting those predicates which he
describes as being affirmed or denied of a suvject: "When you predicate
this thing or that of another thing as of a subject, the predicates then
of the predicate will also hold good of the subject".19 This statement
deserves notice, says Grote, "because it is in fact a brief but distinct
20
announcement of his theory of the syllogism", which he afterward
elaborates and expands in the Analytica Priora, where he discusses it in
21
all its varieties.
Having analyzed propositions separately, dividing them into
separate classes according to their constituent elements, -aristotle then
considers propositions in combination. As a result of this analysis, he
reaches the conclusion that the syllogism is fundamental to all reasoning;
and he defines the syllogism as follows:
A syllogism is a form of words in which
when certain assumptions are made, something
other than what has been assumed necessarily
follows from the fact that the assumptions
are such. 22
Now Aristotle's assumption that the syllogism is the fundamental
form of reasoning is no arbitrary assumption, but depends to a great ex-
tent upon the results of his analysis of the function of language. His
23
syllogism is based upon an immediate intuition of ultimate premises,
19, Grote translates this: "Whatever predicate can be truly affirmed
or denied of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of
the subject"; ARI, 65,
20, Grote, ARI, 65,
21, Aristotle discusses the syllogism in three figures only. The
introduction of the fourth figure is attributed to Galen (2nd century
A.D. ) by Averroes (12th century A.D.), and is frequently referred to as
the "Galenian Figure"; Frye & Levi, KB, 277.
22, Aristotle, Analytica Priora, I, b 19-21.
23, Cf. Chapter I, 14.
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and upon certain laws of thought which he considers to be the presuppos-
itions upon which all reasoning is based.
It should be noted here that syllogistic logic deals with the
results of thinking rather than with the nature of the thought process,
"Its object is less to give an account of the way in which thinking goes
on, than to show how the ideas and thoughts we already possess may be
combined so as to lead to conclusions that are certain, and that will
24
compel assent" • It is largely with words, as the expression of
thought, that syllogistic logic deals. Yet it is important to remember
that the rules formulated in syllogistic logic are not arbitrary and
external, but find their justification in the nature of thought itself.
In order to understand syllogistic logic correctly, therefore, it is
necessary to look beyond the words and propositions dealt with to the
thought whose nature they express.
Fundamental to the principle of the syllogism is the principle
25traditionally called the dictum de omni et null
o
, which means that what-
ever is predicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term dis-
tributed may be predicated in like manner of everything contained under
it. This means simply that what may be affirmed of all things in a given
class may be affirmed also of any one or any part of those things in-
cluded in the class, and what may be denied of all things in a class may
be denied of any one or any part of them. This is the principle of class
24. Creighton, IL, 45.
25. The latin phrase means, "Statement concerning all and none".

inclusion or exclusion. This dictum is the foundation of syllogistic
deduction. In addition, the valid operation of the syllogism requires as
presuppositions certain fundamental principles traditionally referred to
as the "laws of thought". These laws of thought are usually regarded as
axioms, or propositions which require no independent proof because they
are in themselves self-evident. These principles are three in number:
(1) The Law of Identity . Whatever is, is; A is A.
(2) The Law of Contradiction . Nothing can both be and not be;
A is not non-A.
(3) The Law of Excluded Middle . There is no middle ground be-
tween contradictories; any term, A, is either B or non-B.
The statement of these principles appears in the highest degree
foolish, for their meaning seems obvious to anyone who stops to think
about them. Yet their position as basic to valid syllogizing is import-
ant, and often reasoning is invalid because the principles underlying it
are so obvious as to have been overlooked. The important thing about
these laws is that they are fundamental to consistency , and their self-
evident character lies in the fact that they cannot be denied without at
the same time asserting them. As soon as you try to get along without
them, you assert them.
The basic law of thought might be said to be either the Law of
Identity or the Law of Contradiction, depending upon whether the principle
is stated affirmatively or negatively. Both of these laws are actually
the same, the only difference being a positive or a negative expression.
Their priority one over the other is immaterial, for whichever one is
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taken to be prior, the other is necessarily presupposed by it. Both of
these laws are simply the expression, in either affirmative or negative
form, respectively, of the principle of consistency ; the fundamental
postulate of all thought that it must, as the minimum requirement of
truth, at least be consistent with itselfo All that the Law of Identity
means is the fact that, if there is to be any knowledge, the character of
notions or concepts must remain fixed. This does not mean that objects
cannot change or cease to exist or that what is true at this moment must
be true forever; it means only that we can consider an object of thought
in as many aspects as we please and still recognize that we are concerned
with the same identical object of thought.
The Law of Contradiction means simply that we cannot both affirm
and deny the same thing at the same time; nothing can have at the same
time and at the same place contradictory and inconsistent qualities. It
really involves the distinction between "is" and "is not". In other
words, we contradict ourselves if we say that an object is both black and
26
white in the same respect at the same time.
The Law of Sxcluded Middle results partly from the statement of
the previous two laws, and partly from Aristotle *s differentiation be-
tween contraries and contradictories. The law is really the complement
of the Law of Contradiction and means simply that every statement must be
either true or false; it cannot be both at the same time.
26. See Hamilton, HIL, II, 58-59, where he holds that the Law of
Contradiction ought more properly to be called the "Law of Non-Contra-
diction", as it enjoins the absence of contradiction as the indispensable
condition of thought.
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These laws, then, are universally and necessarily true, and when
applied in reasoning about objects, become the foundation of reasoning,
Hamilton has aptly called them "the conditions of the thinkable". 27 All
acts of reasoning proceed from certain judgments, and the act of judging
consists in comparing two ideas to see whether they agree or differ. The
laws of thought inform us as to the nature of this identity or difference
with which all thought is concerned. The use of these fundamental prin-
ciples, coupled with the dictum de omni et nullo , makes the reasoning
contained in the syllogism valid.
The Greek word cro^hoytOAUoS occurs in Plato, but not in the
sense given to it by Aristotle, and, as we have seen, no one at an
earlier date had made any attempt to give a systematic account of the
process of inference. The nearest appraoch, probably, was Plato's form-
ulation of the process of logical division, which Aristotle refers to as
28
a "weak syllogism". Aristotle's primary interest in developing the
syllogism was in laying down the conditions of scientific knowledge -
this he states to be his purpose in the beginning of the Analytica
Priora, and towards this the formal study of the syllogism was the first
step.
Aristotle's logic, although resulting in a purely formal dis-
cipline, had its basis in epistemology, or in Aristotle's conception of
27. Hamilton, LML, II, 57.
28. Aristotle, Analytica Priora
,
46a, 33. Aristotle is thinking of
Plato's establishment of definition by means of the division by di-
chotomy.
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the task of thought; this task of thought could only be understood by a
definition of the relation of knowledge to its object. As such, logic
has its roots in the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of ideas. 29 That which
truly is, is the general or universal , and knowledge of this is the con-
ception . Aristotle opposes the arbitrary separation of the general from
the particular, 30 and conceives the real task of logic to be that of
recognizing the true relation between the general and the particular, and
therefore the fundamental form of abstract or conceptual thought stands
in the center of his logic. If the question is asked, How can one prove
anything scientifically? Aristotle would answer that scientific proof
consists only in the deduction of the particular from the general. nto
prove scientifically means to state the grounds for the validity of what
is asserted, and these are to be found only in the more general under
which the particular is subsumed" » *
Since proof consists in deduction, it is the task of logic to
determine exactly what this deduction is, or, in other words, to set
forth those forms in which thought perceives the dependence of the part-
icular upon the general. It is as a result of the analysis of those
activities of thought in which all deduction consists that Aristotle
arrives at the syllogism as the fundamental form of all reasoning. Thus
£9. Windelband, HP, 133.
30. What Aristotle attacks in Plato's theory of ideas was only the
Sleatic assumption of absence of relation between the general and parti-
cular, between Ideas and phenomena; Cf. Aristotle, MET, I, 9; XIII, 4.
31. Windelband, HP, 134.

all reasoning for Aristotle consists in the deduction of one judgment
from two other judgments.
It is to be noted that the conclusion of any syllogism is a
statement of the relations between the middle term and two other concepts,
and that this relation is always of one kind only: a relation of the sub-
ordination of the particular under the general. The only question ever
considered in syllogistic logic is whether one concept (the subject) is
to be considered as subordinate to another (the predicate) or not. And
thus Aristotle's treatment of the judgment concerns itself with the only
two elements which essentially affect this relation of subordination:
Quantity, which denotes a kind of subordination, whether that kind is
distinguished as universal, particular, or singular; and Quality, which
denotes that the relation is either affirmed or denied, or, that a
relationship of inclusion or exclusion is asserted as existing between
the two concepts.
As a result of the analytic method which Aristotle used in his
formulation of syllogistic logic, certain limitations of syllogistic
logic emerge.
In the first place, syllogistic logic is of an abstract or
formal character, Aristotle's immediate aim was methodological, and the
methodological character of his logic is responsible for the fact that
32
it is abstract and formal. That syllogistic possesses this character-
istic is demonstrated by the fact that the truth of a given proposition
32. Windelband, HP, 133.
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remains unaffected by the substitution of symbols for terms. The
material with which syllogistic logic deals is supplied in the form of
concepts and judgments. The problem of syllogistic logic is to show what
combinations of concepts or judgments can be employed as premises which
lead to valid conclusions in the syllogism. Aristotle was dealing with
validating forms of inference, and he shows these forms in abstraction
from the particular subject matter to which they apply.
As we have seen, the operation of drawing a conclusion from two
premises in the syllogism is based upon the principle of consistency or
non-contradiction, and the limitation of this vehicle of reasoning is
noted in the fact that, in so far as the doctrine of the syllogism is
concerned, anything is true which is not self-contradictory. Aristotle's
logic is a logic of consistency, or classes within classes; it does not
take into consideration classifications which depend upon actual truth or
falsity. AH it deals with is the possibility that given propositions
might be true, or they might be false. Syllogistic logic shows only how
certain conclusions follow consistently from certain premises, and for
this purpose all considerations of truth or falsity are irrelevant.
Logic thus abstracts the form from the matter, leaving aside the actual
truth or falsehood and confining itself to formal validity.
At this point the difference between validity and truth should
be made clear. Burtt defines a true proposition as one that agrees with
34
the relevant facts. Truth, therefore, has to do with the agreement of
33. Cf. Chapter I, 16-18.
34. Burtt, RT, 113.
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a proposition with reality. Validity , on the other hand, refers to an
implication which obtains between propositions, "An implication obtains
between two propositions, and therefore the inference of one from the
other is valid, when and only when the truth of the second is warranted by
35
the truth of the first". Thus, a given conclusion may be said to be
true or false and valid or invalid. When a proposition is said to be
true or false, what is meant is that it is either correct or incorrect,
respectively, as a description of the facts which it purports to describe.
When a proposition is said to be valid or invalid, what is meant is that
it is or is not implied by the premises from which it is drawn. Thus,
the validity of propositions may be said to incorporate formal truth; for
the truth in this case depends on the formal relations between proposi-
tions. Formal truths are guaranteed by the nature of formal reason it-
self. Material truth
,
however, can be tested only by an appeal to
matters- of-fact - to experience. In the case of formal logic, all that is
taken into account is formal truth; material truth may be involved in it,
or it may not, "What is important in actual reasoning is that the two
kinds of truth, formal truth and material truth, be merged; for the
principles governing the formal relations do guarantee the truth of con-
clusions derived from true premises w ,36
Deductive logic, therefore, comes to its end in the statement of
35, Burtt, RT., 113,
36, Frye & Levi, RB, 259,

the principles of valid reasoning. Although Aristotle did relate his
formal science to reality37 and would never hold that it did not apply to
real things, his results are in a distinct sense formal, not material, and
it is in this fact that Aristotle* s logic is sharply defined from that of
Hegel,
Syllogistic logic frequently results in an artificial separation
between the truth of consistency and material truth. It is possible, as
Aristotle himself recognized, to be logically consistent and yet to
arrive at a conclusion which is materially false. Aristotle*s logic is
therefore distinctly and specifically a limited instrument, for it does
not produce new truth; it brings to light only what is specifically im-
plied in truths which are already known. This fact constiutes the
second limitation of syllogistic logic: its failure as an adequate in-
strument for the discovery of new truth. It is limited to those premises
already available to us. Aristotle recognized the necessity of basing
his syllogistic reasoning upon ultimate principles whose truth is a
certainty. Only thus might his conclusions be certain. But the method
he adopted for the obtaining of such ultimate principles (recourse to
immediate intuition) gives us absolutely no way in which to acquire new
truth. Aristotle did lay emphasis upon induction and examples, even when
37. Cf. F.C.S. Schiller, FL, 8. See Grote, ARI, 61-64, where he
discusses, under the Categories, Aristotle's distinction between matters
predicated of a subject and matters predicated in a subject. Aristotle,
in the first treatise of the Organ on
,
appears to blend logic and ontology
into one.
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limited in number, and he regarded induction as clearer to us, more per-
suasive, and more intelligible in terms of sense than deduction.
In the Analytica Priora he attempted to bring induction under
syllogistic testing, but the attempt was not very successful, "He seems
here to have supposed that Induction required to be perfect, i.e., to exor-
brace all possible specimen or cases in order to be fully cogent. Yet
elsewhere he also recognized an Induction which falls short of such com-
38pleteness". It is unfortunate that Aristotle did not devote more
attention to hypothesis and experiment. There is no doubt but that
Aristotelian logic has a real value of its own, and that its value has
been recognized by and has greatly influenced western civilization. But
we are no longer content merely to exhibit the supposed certainty of what
knowledge we already possess - we feel that to gain new knowledge is more
important than establishing the certainty of what we already have. Since
Aristotle derived his patterns from mathematics and language, his logic
stressed certainty rather than the adventure upon which so much of modern
scientific discovery has depended.
Dubs points out that there has been a misunderstanding on the
part of many modern philosophers as to the proper function of formal
logic and the syllogism, so that many of them, beginning with Descartes
and Bacon, have criticized the Aristotelian logic. In connection with
this fact, Dubs remarks:
38. Warbeke, SI.IG, 285-286. Cf. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora,
100b, 31; Analytica Priora, 68b, 24-37; Topica, 105a, 13-16.
r

They supposed that the function of logic is
to discover new knowledge, that logic is the science
and art of reasoning, that it should give truth;
while they found that logic, especially the syllo-
gism, cannot discover anything new, but can only
set out those truths already given. They also
found that the procedure of the syllogism is a
petitio principii ; that the natural procedure in
argument is not syllogistic; and that syllogism
cannot convince absolutely or give truth, because
it can never prove its major premises. They there-
fore concluded that syllogistic logic is useless.
These objections, which constitute the staple of
the traditional attacks upon deductive logic and
the Aristotelian syllogism, are due to a misunder-
standing of the nature of logic; philosophers
have expected logic to do that for which it is
unfitted, and then have become disappointed in
logic! The better procedure would have been first
to have discovered the proper function of logic
before criticizing her.
Warbeke, also, 40 tells us that to expect formal logic to lead to
the discovery of new truth is foolish. The fundamental nature of logic
is basic to all science, philosophy, and religion, but it is not to be
supposed that logic will give us knowledge in these fields; it is im-
portant, not as a method of discovery, but as a means of testing the
correctness of the instruments of reason. Two extremes ought to be
avoided: the position that logic is unnecessary, and the position that it
is a means to knowledge.
We ought, then, to guard against expecting from logic more than
it can furnish us. Logic tests conclusions - it does not of itself pro-
duce them. Thus, Dubs reminds us:
39. Dubs, RI, 196.
40. V/arbeke, SI,©, 276.
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Purely deductive reasoning is... powerless to
draw a single conclusion with certainty fot its
material truth/. The syllogism. • .is not an in-
strument of discovery but merely an instrument of
criticism. ...The function of a syllogism is merely
to test an inference that is already drawn, to
determine its validity, or to indicate what pro-
positions are needed to establish a conclusion
whose ground is already partially given. 4^
The limitation of syllogistic logic here is a real one, and the
objection is valid if the limitation and scope of syllogistic logic is
kept before the mind. Nothing can be established by deduction alone, and
unless certainty can be had by some non-deductive means, no certainty can
be obtained by deductive means.
Another limitation of syllogistic logic arises from its basic
principle that every proposition consists of a subject qualified by a
predicate; that is, syllogistic logic is limited by its conception of
classes, and by its principle of class inclusion and class exclusion.
Knowledge for Aristotle consisted exclusively of definition and classifi-
cation. A thing was defined when the mind had grasped the essence which
makes things to be what they truly are. Classification concerned the
ontological exclusions and inclusions of objects in real natural kinds or
species. In Aristotle's classification, he believed the number of specie*
and genera to be limited and explorable, and their properties to be the
same forever. Consequently, everything that is can be classified
according to a specific genus.
41. Dubs, RI, 186, 188. See his analysis here.
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On this basis, Aristotle analyzes propositions into subject and
predicate, each of which constitutes a class, and the principle of the
syllogism serves to either include in or exclude from a given class. His
logic, therefore, deals only with that which is common to large classes
of propositions, and he analyzes propositions solely into one subject and
one predicate, with either inclusion in a class, or exclusion from a
class, as the quality of the proposition.
In such a treatment of propositions, syllogistic logic is nec-
essarily limited, for no inference can ever be drawn about the relations
of two objects to each other unless the object with which each of them
is compared is is both cases the same. In other words, syllogistic
deduction is possible only when a relation of identity can be established
between two like things and a conclusion which is identical to them (or
at least may be treated so). Relationships between propositions are
therefore ultimately reducible to relationships between their terms. The
logic does not conceive the idea of any proposition as standing, by it-
self as a whole, in logical relationship to any other proposition as a
whole; the treatment of propositions as single, unanalyzed entities has
no place in it.
Aristotle assumed with insufficient proof that a conclusion can
be obtained only when a subject-predicate relationship between two terms
is inferred from subject-predicate relations between them and a third
42
term. If Aristotle had studied mathematics closely enough he would
42. Ross, ARI, 32.
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have recognized the existence of non-syllogistic relations, such as
quality, to the right of, etc, which are just as cogent as the syllo-
gistic relation,
Stebbing refers to the failure of Aristotelian logic to recog-
43
nize different propositional forms as a "radical defect". Modern
logic (symbolic or mathematical) recognizes thi3 limitation and carries
logic beyond Aristotle, forming generalizations about any proposition,
whether that proposition can be analyzed into subject or predicate or not.
To sum up, then, syllogistic logic is primarily a method for
criticizing thought; it is an instrument for determining the consistency
of our ideas, and as such constitutes the minimum ground for truth.
Ideas which are inconsistent cannot be true. But only thus far does
syllogistic logic go. As a method, it can never lead to the discovery of
new truth; it is a specifically limited instrument designed solely to
demonstrate or exhibit the certainty of our formulation of what knowledge
we already possess, and even then it does not include in its scope all of
the relations of that truth. It treats knowledge from an atomistic,
analytic point of view. It treats knowledge from the point of view of
its parts without taking into consideration wholes which have properties
which their parts do not possess. It is restricted solely to the de-
ducing of implications concerning objects or ideas which they may
possess by virtue of their belonging to a given class. It deals solely
with the formal operation of thought processes without relating these
43, Stebbing, MIL, 139,

processes to material truth.. Syllogistic logic, therefore, is an ex-
tremely limited instrument. In the words of Gomperz, "rigour and con-
sistency of thought - these are in truth the highest aims of the Aristo-
telian logic, at once its strength and its limitation, 44
When we turn to a study of Hegel's logic we shall see that Hegel
did not, as is often maintained, utterly discard syllogistic logic; on
the contrary, he included it as a part of his logical system, Hegel's
logic will be seen to regard the limitations and deficiencies of syllo-
gistic logic as soluble in a larger whole of which it is a legitimate
part. Consequently, Hegel goes far beyond it in comprehensiveness of
treatment and comprehensiveness of result.
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44, Gomperz, GT, IY, 49,

CHAPTER THREE
THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF HEGEL* S LOGIC
The historians of philosophy are unanimous in their declarations
that of all the philosophical systems that have ever been set up, that of
Hegel is by far the most comprehensive and inclusive. His philosophical
system is prodigious in its complexity and scope, and the contributions
of all the great minds of the past are in it absorbed and preserved and
given new life and continuity with the whole of human knowledge and ex-
perience. All great thinkers had a part in influencing Hegel* s thought,
but two influences in particular are greater than any of the others: the
idealism of the Greeks, and the critical philosophy of Iromanuel Kant.
The significance of Kegel in the history of philosophy may be
said to be the fact that he unites in one system the Aristotelian and
Kantian movements in thought,^" The fundamental principles of Hegel are
the fundamental principles of the Greeks and of Kant, Wallace mentions
this continuity between the thought of Plato and Aristotle and that of
Hegel in his introduction to Hegel *s Philosophy of Mind :
What Hegel proposes to give is no novel or
special doctrine, but the universal philosophy
which has passed on from age to age, here narrowed
and there widened, but still essentially the same.
It is conscious of its continuity and proud of its
identity with the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, 2
1, Harris, HL, 25,
2, Hegel, POM (Wallace), 9.
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It is interesting to note that Wallace refers to the philosophy
of Hegel as containing essentially the "universal philosophy". The same
terminology is used by Stace, who holds that Hegel's system is the syn-
thesis of that which is characteristic of the universal, underlying truth
in all the history of thought,,
The fact that Hegel unites in one system the thought of the
Greeks and the thought of Kant may be expressed in other words by saying
that the ontological, objective movement in Greek philosophy, and the
psychological, subjective movement of modern philosophy as represented by
the supreme achievement of Kant, both come to the same conclusion; i.e.,
both arrive at personal consciousness as the highest principle of life.
Or, to express the same fundamental idea in characteristically Hegelian
terms, the objective philosophy of the Greeks may be termed the thesis,
the subjective philosophy of Kant the antithesis, and the philosophy of
Hegel the synthesis, which absorbs both, and rises beyond them to form a
new whole having entirely new properties. Diagrammed, this important fact
appears somewhat as follows:
Aristotelian (objective) ^ personal reason^
C_ Hegelian
Kantian (subjective) - _. ^ personal reason J
It will be advantageous to sketch briefly how this conclusion
is arrived at.
3. The general outline followed here is that of Harris, HL, 22-34.
Windelband gives a good treatment of Plato and Aristotle from the point
of view of the problems involved, HP, 99-154.

The outstanding characteristic of early Greek philosophy is the
objective nature of its investigations. On the whole, Greek philosophy
investigated the objective coefficient of knowledge; what necessarily is
4
rather than how we know it. The Milesian philosophers, for example,
were interested in the nature of reality. Beginning with Thales (624-
546 B.C.), who first gave expression to the principle that beneath the
various forms of the appearance of matter there is an underlying, uni-
fying structure, the Milesians were the first to face this basic philo-
sophical problem squarely and attempt to answer it without recourse to
supernatural explanation. They all adopted the notion of a single,
cosmic substance, or "stuff" of the universe, as the basic principle of
reality. They assumed reality to be composed of such common physical and
material substances as air and water. Although the incessant change ex-
hibited by nature was accepted as self-evident and in no need of further
analysis and explanation, they did give voice to a belief in the homo-
geneity and unity of the world, even though that unity was to be found
in a material substance of some sort,
For our purpose we need only mention the work of Heraclitus in
seeking to find the ultimate reality in change; the work of the Sleatics
in their denial of change and their seeking to find the ultimate reality
in a pure Being which nullified any change or variety; and the work of
the Atomists in seeking, in the face of the undeniable experience of
4, It is true that the Greek thinkers did deal with problems of
psychology, ethics, and the problem of how knowledge is possible, but the
metaphysical character of their investigations is prominent enough to
warrant the above assertion.

change and the demand of thought for some kind of permanence, to harmonize
the positions of the Bleatics and of Heraclitus and to discover the ulti-
mate reality that would incorporate within it both permanence and change.
In connection with these early thinkers, it is interesting to note that
Hegel looks upon them in the light of the dialectical movement of thought
of which we shall see more later. He considers that the Bleatics with
their pure being constituted a thesis , in which the dialectic was a sub-
jective one, resting in the contemplation of the subject (Zeno), and the
Absolute was therefore an abstract identity. The next step in the dia-
lectic is that it must become objective, and this was brought about by
Heraclitus, who, Hegel says, understands the Absolute as the process of
the dialectic whereby the Absolute becomes manifested as change in things.
Of course, a third step is necessary to produce the synthesis ,which is
the unity of the thesis (Bleatics) and antithesis (Heraclitus). Thus,
Hegel says of Heraclitus:
The advance requisite and made by Heraclitus
is the progression from Being as the first immed-
iate thought, to the category of Becoming as the
second. This is the first concrete, the Absolute,
as in it the unity of opposites. Thus with Hera-
clitus the philosophic idea is to be met with in
its speculative form; the reasoning of Parmenides
and Zeno is abstract understanding. ...Here we see
land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which
I have not adopted in my Logic.
The consummation of Greek metaphysics is to be found in the work
of Plato and Aristotle, the great system-builders of Greek philosophy.
5. Cf. Hegel, HP, I, 239-240.
6. Ibid., I, 278-279.

Plato may be looked upon as the first philosopher to advance the idea
that reality is fundamentally immaterial. His philosophy may he said to
7
be characterized by two convictions J first, he was convinced that what-
ever the real may be, it must be that which is eternal, everlasting, un-
changing, and perfect. This conviction, be it noted, was fundamentally
Eleatic. Second, he was convinced that the sort of reality he believed
genuine could not be found anywhere in the physical world . These two
convictions "possessed Plato from the early years of his intellectual
development. They became fundamental principles governing his thought and
served to delineate the broad boundaries of his metaphysics and epistem-
ology",
8
As a result of these considerations, Plato was led to postulate
a realm of Ideas , of objective universals which have an existence inde-
pendent of the human mind and of nature. These Ideas constitute the
ultimate reality. Whatever is real is the realm of phenomena is real
only because of the participation of the universal Idea in it, 9 It
should be noted here that these "Ideas" are not corporeal entities in the
7. Burgess, IHP, 93,
8. Ibid., 93.
9. Plato was never too clear about the relation between these two
realms, Ideas and Phenomena. In the Phaedrus , he emphasizes the inde-
pendence of the Ideas, and the relation of phenomena to them is one of
imitation or resemblance rather than participation. In the Parmenides
,
Plato criticizes the theory of Ideas, recognizing the problem as to how
the universal Ideas can be known at all if they are absolutely independ-
ent of us. It is to be noted that in his later dialogues, Sophist , Pol-
iticus, Timaeus
,
Philebus , and Laws , Plato variously modifies his theory.
For a clear account of Plato's theory of Ideas, see Burgess,
IHP, 93-100.
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1 physical world, nor are they mental entities like the ideas present in the
human mind. The Platonic Ideas are not in the mind either of man or of
God. They are a special kind of entity which philosophy has traditionally
spoken of as "substance"; that kind of entity which is self-dependent,
self-existent, timeless, spaceless, and changeless, and which is itself
the cause or essential nature of all things.
There are, then, two distinct realms of being for Plato; the
realm of phenomena, of time and 3pace relationships, and the realm of
the eternal, universal Ideas. It is the realm of Ideas that explains the
realm of phenomena, not the reverse. The phenomenal world Plato looks
upon as being "unreal"; the world of sense takes on a measure of reality
only in proportion to the degree to which objects in it correspond to, or
partake of, the universal Ideas. Plato's result is a dualism between the
phenomenal world known by sense-perception, and the eternal, transcend-
ental world of Ideas, which is reality, and known only by reason. True
knowledge consists in a comprehension of the universal Ideas through
reason as over against the uncertain understanding obtained by mistaking
the phenomenal world for the real, through sense perception. Because of
the nature of the phenomenal world, the source of knowledge cannot be
sensation, but reason, for sensation can never give us concepts of the
eternal Ideas,
Plato thus drew a distinction between sense and reason, and be-
tween appearance and reality. From these considerations, two important
points emerge:
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(1) The real is the universal. 10 Reality is that which has a
wholly dependent being; appearance is that which has only dependent
being. The real is now the universal and does not exist. 11 Only part-
iculars exist, and the theory of Ideas leads to the conclusion that the
particulars which are perceived by sense-perception can be said to be real
only to the degree to which they participate in, or partake of, the real-
ity of the universal Idea. Thus, if appearance is dependent upon reality,
reality must somehow produce the appearance. 12 This leads to the second
important proposition of the universal philosophy:
(2) The universal is that absolute and ultimate being which is
is
the foundation of all things, and which produces the world out of itself.
Plato* s outstanding contribution may be said to lie in the fact
that he emphasized the nature of reality as fundamentally immaterial, and
this conception of reality was developed further by Plato's great pupil,
Aristotle. Plato's theory of Ideas immediately gave rise to the great
problem of later Greek thought, and, indeed, one which troubled the minds
of many thinkers through the Middle Ages and was partly responsible for
the controversy between nominalism and realism. The essential problem,
10. Stace, POH, U. This statement is held by Stace to be the
essential determination of what he calls the "universal philosophy", and
the central element of idealism, whether of Plato, of Aristotle, or of
Hegel.
11. The term "existence" is used with reference to that which is_ in
the time and space order of the world.
12. The statement that the world is an "appearance" means only that
its existence is dependent upon an ultimate being. It does not mean that
the world is an illusion in any sense.
13. Stace, POH, 14.

simply stated, is this: How unite universal and particular?
Plato recognized the problem raised by his theory of Ideas, and
he had attempted to answer it is his dialogue Timaeus by the conception of
God as an Artificer, not as a Creator; an Artificer who, with the Ideas as
14
models, occupies the position of a Laborer who molds the chaotic mater-
ial of the form-less Receptacle into an ordered cosmos. This is Plato's
answer to the problem of how the universal and the particular are united.
That it really fails to solve the problem is apparent; for matter being
formed after a pattern furnished by the Ideas, and matter being united
with the Ideas, are two entirely different things. The idea that part-
iculars "partake of* or "participate in" the universal Ideas, that they
are "imitations", or "copies", of the Ideas, is open to question at the
15
point of its intelligibility. 3ut it should be remembered that Plato
talks here in the language of probability, not certainty; it is the best
account he was able to give.
Aristotle, too, recognized the difficulty inherent in Plato's
doctrine, and he objected to the theory of Ideas on the ground that it
16
set up an arbitrary and unreasonable separation of experience.
Aristotle, therefore, takes Plato's conception of reality as essentially
immaterial and from it discovers the principle of absolute truth, which
he applies to both nature and man.
Aristotle's view may be summed up as follows: 17
14. "Demi-urge" in the Greek is the regular word for artisan.
15. Burgess, IHP, 114.
16. Cf. Harris, HL, 31; Windelband, HP, 133; Aristotle, MBT, I, 9.
17. It is impossible to do more here than give a cursory view of
Aristotle's metaphysics. For a good, brief treatment, see Burgess, IHP,
118-124. Cf. Harris* treatment with reference to Hegel, HL, 32-34.
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The uniting of universal and particular is accomplished by
holding as an intuitive principle that the real is composed of substances
exhibited in particular things and that these substances are many. In
other words, the primal existence is substance , which is self-dependent,
and upon which all else depends. Substance is not a transcendental Idea,
but is constituted by the concrete, individual thing which is a complex
of Form and Matter . The unity of universal and particular is to be
found in the principle of causality , which Aristotle posits in four
aspects, all of which together constitute active reason :
(1) Formal Cause - the agent by which a thing is produced; it is
really the definition of a thing.
(2) Material Cause - the "stuff** out of which things are made.
It is not necessarily material or physical, but there must be something
the formal cause can deal with.
(3) Final Cause - the purpose or end in view.
(4) Efficient Cause - the power that makes the formal cause apply
to the material cause to achieve the final cause.
In terms of an illustration, the formal cause might be said to be
the blueprint of a house that is to be built; the material cause would be
the material out of which the house is made; the final cause would be the
purpose or end in view (to live in); and the efficient cause would be the
carpenter who furnishes the energy by which the actual operation is per-
formed.
18. Aristotle, MST, IV.

When these four causes are applied to nature, there is a sub-
ordination of the efficient and final causes to the formal, leaving only-
two causes to account for all things in nature: the formal cause (Form)
and the material cause (Matter), Both of these causes are to be thought
of as real and simultaneous in occurrence.
Matter and Form correspond, in Aristotle, to Potentiality and
Actuality, respectively. Matter , be it noted, is not a material sub-
stance, but a metaphysical concept which refers to "raw-material" J to the
formless from the viewpoint of specific form. Form refers to the
structural organization or order of matter. Matter nowhere occurs as
"pure"; pure matter without form is a conceptual abstraction. The in-
dividual is_ the matter as structure. On the other hand, there is no
19
matter-less form, except in the one case of Pure Form, or God. The
individual ijs the form as organization and development.
From the relation and function of form and matter, Aristotle*
s
system of development emerges. Any single object must be regarded as
both form and matter. Burgess suggests that if we think of nature as an
hierarchy, at one extreme of which is matter with very little form, at
the other extreme of which is Pure Form without matter, the idea will be
20
more easily grasped. Between these extremes lie all the particular
things containing various degrees of form and matter. Individual things
19. Aristotle posits God as "actus purus* , Pure Form, to escape
being caught in the infinite regress.
20. Burgess, IHP, 121.

are so related in the hierarchy that any particular object will be the
form of the one below it, and the matter of the one above it. Each part-
icular in nature is potentially a higher form; the material for higher
development. The change or activity that goes on in nature is the
process of form realizing itself in matter. All things develop according
to the inner principles of the forms inherent in them. This inner com-
pelling force Aristotle calls "entelechy" (having purpose within), and the
whole realm of nature is conceived as one vast process of the movement or
realization of potentiality toward Pure Zorm, or God. God is the Prime
Mover, who, while exerting no activity upon the world, draws the world to
himself by his intrinsic perfection. 21 He it is who supplies the
attractive force that makes possible the unfolding of the immanent poten-
tialities of each form through the medium of matter.
Note here that God is not an impersonal Being; God is a con-
22
scious, thinking Being who contemplates his own thought and Being. He
is self-knowing, personal Reason. He is a perfect, living Being whose
form of cognition is knowing by wholes or totalities, which Aristotle
terms "speculative knowing". This is the highest activity of mind: the
knowing of all the relations of a given thing in its cause.
The point to be stressed as a result of all of this is that the
Aristotelian metaphysics, which is the consummation of the objective in-
vestigation of reality by the Greeks, is throughout purposive and teleo-
logical. The ultimate reality for Aristotle is God as active Reason
,
21. Aristotle, MET, VIII,
22. Aristotle* s term is voices \c^er^^3 '» "thinking of thinking".
There was no Greek word for consciousness at the time he wrote.
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and all occurrences in nature follow from an inner necessity produced by-
active Reason immanent in nature.
The end of objective philosophy, then, is the arrival at a con-
ception of reality as mind or reason immanent in the world of nature. We
shall see that the end of subjective will be the same conception,
Ancient scepticism had doubted the existence of objects in the
physical world, and in this scepticism is to be found the root of modern
subjective scepticism. The development toward a subjective philosophy
moved through the controversy over universals; the controversy between
nominalism and realism. "There is a perpetual recurrence of the anti-
23
thesis between subjective and objective methods". Nominalism held that
universals are not real, but are all only subjective syntheses of
thought; mere classifications. Reality consists of isolated individuals,
each independent of the other. This is an atomistic view of reality, and
its result is that nothing can be explained except on the postulation of
an external intelligence who arranges and combines the independent atoms
to produce the phenomena which we perceive in the world, All relations
between the atoms must be transferred to the ordering intelligence, so
that atomism collapses, for the atoms have become a useless scaffolding;
the "ordering intellect" has become all in all. The only positive
aspect of nominalism is that it attributes universality to the mind; for
by making universality a product of the mind, it unconsciously attrib-
utes all substantial being to mind. Thus, Harris says, nominalism is the
23, Harris, HL, 37.
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"triumph of shallow thought over deeper and truer thought",
24
and it is
forever dead because of the rise of the doctrine of the correlation of
forces and the persistence of force in modern science, for modern science
is realistic and holds to energy or activity rather than things as the
true reality.
The controversy, however, continued up to David Hume and his
complete scepticism. There is no metaphysical causality in the world as
far as we can know, according to Hume, There is only the sequence of
events in time. The basic reason for this is that every possible object
of knowledge is reducible either to an impression or an idea. In spite
of all the analysis we wish to make, the only relations between objects
25
that we perceive are "those of continguity and succession". The only
reason we have for believing in cause is that we have found a continguous
relationship to exist between what we call the effect and what we call
the cause; two events related only by the fact that we have perceived
them to succeed one another in time. The outcome of such a sceptical
attitude is to arrive at the conclusion that a metaphysical cause has no
reality; it is only a product of the mind.
From this point Immanuel Kant went on to develop an explanation
of the world of man and the world of nature in time and space in terms of
our subjective nature,
•
Kant*s object was to determine the precise relation between
thought and the object of knowledge. Two sources of knowledge were open
24. Harris, HL, 35,
25. Burtt, EPBM, 629, 635.
Gt
(I
t
c
72
to Mm: the perceptions given through, experience, and the conceptions
derived from a priori principles supposed by rationalism to be innate,
Hume had demonstrated that the constitutive forms of the conceptual know-
ledge of reality are not given in perception, but are merely the products
of association which have no demonstrable relation to the real. On the
other hand, reflection indicated that reality could not be known by
"given" conceptions. In other words, neither empiricism nor rationalism
26
could explain the relation between knowledge and its object. Kant's
27
answer to the problem is found in his Critique of Pure Reason.
For Kant, everything known or thought or expressed in language
is known or thought or expressed by means of notions, ideas, or concepts,
and explained by words which symbolize these general predicates or cate-
gories. Some of these are generalized from experience; others are
furnished by the mind itself as a priori conditions necessary to all ex-
perience. The latter Kant calls "thought-forms'* , and shows that they are
not derived from experience inasmuch as they are necessary for the very
beginnings of such notions. These are called "pure thought" because they
28
are free from all elements derived from contingent experience.
The important thing about Kant's results is that he holds that
to investigate the pure thought-notions is to investigate the laws of
existence as it is known or knowable in experience. In other words, we
cannot conceive existence as possible in any modes other than those of
26. Cf. Windelband, HP, 537-538.
27. See Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure
Reason*; also, Watson, PKB, 27, 31-46.
28. Cf. Smith, CKCPR, 53-56; also xxxiii.
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the a priori notions of the mind. These forms are, however, not "sub-
jective", as Kant held; we cannot deny their validity as laws of all
being without contradicting ourselves by setting up at the same time other
notions or thoughts which transcend these "categories*. Such a notion is
Kant's notion of the "ding-an-sich" . The "thing-in-itself " cannot exist
without coming under some of the subjective categories of the mind. As
Harris remarks,
As for the objective, then, which is opposed
to our subjectivity and unknowable by us, it cannot
be extant in the world of nature or in the world of
man. It is a pure figment of the imagination, and
cannot exist in any possible world without becoming
"subjective" at once.
The point of significance here is that both the objective
method of Greek philosophy and the subjective method of modern critical
philosophy lead ultimately to the interpretation of reality in terms of
mind. Hegel* s system is the synthesis of the results of these two
methods of investigation.
His philosophy, in fact, may be regarded
as simply the systematic attenpt to reconcile
the essential tendencies and ideals of Greek
and modern thought, to harmonize the monistic
universalism of the one with the monadistic
individualism of the other.
Thus Stace, in speaking of Hegel's philosophical system, is led
to remark:
The philosophy of Hegel... is not something
simply invented out of nothing by himself and
29. Harris, EL, 43.
30. Baillie, OSHL, 18. Cf. Windelband, HP, 612.
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flung at random into an astonished world. It is
no crazy fancy of an individual's brain, no gim-
crack novelty. It is not the pet theory of some
erratic genius, nor is it merely one theory among
many rivals. The true author of it is, not so
much Hegel, as the toiling and thinking human
spirit; the universal spirit of humanity getting
itself uttered through this individual. It is
the work of the ages. It has its roots deep in
the past. It is the accumulated wisdom of the
years, the last phase of the one "universal
philosophy". For the truth is, to use a phrase
of Hegel's, neither new or old, but permanent.
The system of Hegel, then, has its origin in the comprehensive
thought of the universal philosophy. It is the synthesis in which all
that is true in previous thought has been included and given new signi-
ficance in a whole that purports to explain adequately the whole of
reality.
Hegel's results arose out of the immediate work of Fichte and
Schelling. Both these thinkers recognized the fact that Kant's results
32
led to the obvious identity of subjectivity and objectivity. The
whole trend of German idealism is toward the resolution of the contradic-
tions raised by Kant's treatment of the "thing-in-itself": the assertion
that things-in-themselves can be thought but not known. Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel all took the lead in attempting to understand the
world as a system of Reason, for there was a growing conviction that "if
the thing-in-itself is to be concluded in philosophy at all it must be
made to function in such fashion that it will make for a clearer, more
31. Stace, POH, 31.
32. Cf. Baillie, OSHL, 43-48.
33. Windelband, HP, 546-547, 569.
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definite understanding of the universe".34 Fichte attempted to solve the
problem of the relationship of the "thing-in-itself" to the rest of real-
ity, and he found that there are only two possible solutions to the prob-
lem; namely, that experience, being an activity of consciousness, can be
derived only from things, or from consciousness. He was led to despair
of including both as the ground of consciousness, and consequently con-
cluded that the unconscious "thing-in-itself" must be dispensed with, for
consciousness can only be understood as a product of something which is
itself of the nature of consciousness. But he saw in the world of nature
more than merely the consciousness of one*s private mental states. He
conceived that the objective world must be considered to be, not the
product of the individual reason, but the product of universal Reason,
which becomes known to the particular mind as the phenomenal world. For
Fichte, the world is fundamentally active and growing, a product of a
basic spiritual activity unfolding itself in the phenomenal. But Fichte
35
was not able to satisfactorily relate the ego with the non-ego, and
this led to Schelling*s attempt to show how both were products of a still
more ultimate reality. The "thing-in-itself" thus becomes Schelling*s
Absolute. But it remained as much in the background as it did in Kant,
never getting into concrete experience, and therefore it never explained
anything. It was essentially undetermined in its content, for with
Schelling "the highest principle can be determined neither as real or
ideal".36
34. Burgess, IHP, 437.
35. Cf. Hegel's criticism of Fichte* s system in his Bncyclopfldie,
119, ISO. In essence, Fichte* s "non-ego" is Kant*s "thing-in-itself".
36. Windelband, HP, 608.
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Schelling's conception of nature as fundamentally a unity with
all parts of the universe being understood adequately .only in relation to
their proper place within the unity of the Absolute Reason, and Fichte's
conception that the universe is Reason in the process of becoming object-
ified, both appear as important points of emphasis in Hegel.
Hegel's reaction to the work of his predecessors was to reject
completely the concept of the "thing-in-itself"; the concept of an Ab-
solute or totality of things which remains hidden forever. "The Thing-
in-itself", he says, "expresses the object when we leave out of sight all
that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all speci-
fic thoughts of it. It is easy to see what is left - utter abstraction,
37
total emptiness, only described still as an * other-world'". Hegel*s
starting-point, therefore, is the belief that the dilemma facing him
could be resolved by assuming that the conditions of knowing are ident-
ical with those of reality itself. In other words, the forms of cog-
nition are the principles of being. What being is may be understood by
an investigation of the forms of thought. In this, Hegel's method is
just the reverse of that of Aristotle. Aristotle would hold that things
come first, and thought follows things rather than things following
thought
•
For Hegel, then, reason and nature are not to be distinguished
from each other; nature, as the manifestation of reason, cannot be dis-
tinguished from it. Hegel, therefore, looks upon a study of the uni-
37. Hegel, Jncyclopadie (Wallace), 91-92.
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versa as it is as the only way of discovering the truth of reality.
There is no need of the useless concept that there is something besides
the universe.
As a result of this, Hegel objects to the common conception of
logic, both syllogistic and transcendental, for he conceives that logic
should be identified with metaphysics. Thus, he says, in the introduction
to his Science of Logic:
Kant considers that logic. .is fortunate
in that it has fallen to its lot to attain so
early to completion, before the other sciences;
for Logic has not taken any step backward since
Aristotle, - but also it has taken no step for-
wards - the latter to all appearance because it
was already finished and complete. If Logic has
undergone no change since Aristotle...what is to
be inferred from this is, that Logic is all the
more in need of a thorough overhaul; for when
Spirit has worked on for two thousand years, it
must have reached a better reflective conscious-
ness of its own thought and its own unadulterated
essence. ...As a matter of fact. ..it may be said
that, both in Form and in Content, as exhibited
in textbooks, Logic has become contemptible. 00
Hegel therefore speaks of Logic in terms of "the inadequate
39lifeless content" of it, and gives as the reasons why it is so empty and
lifeless
:
Its determinations are assumed to stand
immovably rigid and are brought into a merely
external relation with one another. Because
in the operations of judgment and syllogism
it is chiefly their quantitative element that
38. Hegel, SOL, 62.
39. Ibid., 63.
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is referred to and built upon, everything rests
on an external difference, on mere comparison,
and becomes a wholly analytic procedure, a
matter of merely mechanical calculation. The
deduction of the so-called rules and laws
(especially of Syllogism) is not much better
than a manipulation of rods of unequal length
in order to sort and arrange them according to
size - like the child's game of trying to fit
into their right places the various pieces of
a picture puzzle,*0
The way in which logic may be made to live is to give it content
by recognizing it, not merely as the science of the subjective form of
thought, but also as expressing the true nature of being. In other
words, logic ceases to be merely subjective, but becomes objective as
well. Thought and being are identified.
Thoughts may be termed objective thoughts, -
among which are also to be included the forms
which are more especially discussed in the common
logic where they are usually treated as forms of
conscious thought only. Logic therefore coincides
with Metaphysics, the science of things set and
held in thoughts, - thoughts accredited able to
express the essential reality of things. 4 ^-
The chief distinction, then, between the logic of Hegel and
syllogistic logic is the fact that, since Hegel's logic holds the central
place of unfolding the method and principles of all thought, it is much
more comprehensive than formal, syllogistic logic. It is synthetic as
over against the purely analytic character of syllogistic logic. While
syllogistic logic attempts to show only the formal laws of judgment and
the syllogism, as principles by which all knowledge can be expressed,
40. Kegel, SOL, 63.
41. Hegel, Sncyclopadie, 45.
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Hegelian logic undertakes to show the
genesis and indeed the complete biography of
every ultimate "notion" - concept or idea -
which is used or can be used in judgments or
syllogisms to collect or analyze or explain
the contents of experience. It has therefore
to discuss the forms in which existence is
possible, actual, or necessary, and is ontol-
ogy or metaphysic as well as logic, 42
The logic of Hegel is no mere appendage of his system, but an
integral part of it. In a certain sense, it depends upon the results of
43
his Phenomenology of Hind, The Phenomenology is a survey of human ex-
perience as a whole, beginning with the first gleam of consciousness,
working up through consciousness to the Absolute Spirit, and showing the
dynamic relationship that exists between the Absolute Spirit and its
manifestations in human self-consciousness and its institutions (Art,
Religion, the State, etc.). To those who object to Hegel as being too
rationalistic, it should be pointed out that he rests his whole system
upon an empirical basis: a study of the development of human conscious-
ness. This study was undertaken, not as a mere by-product of his system,
external to it and independent of it. The Phenomenology should not be
looked upon as a work from which the presuppositions of the Logic are
derived, but, rather, as a work which "justifies" by an examination and
description of experience certain presuppositions which are at the basis
of the Logic, and which were in the mind of Hegel before he began to
evolve his system on the basis of them. This fact Baillie brings out
when he says:
42. Karris, HL, 20.
43. This fact is stated by Hegel himself in his Encyclopfldie, 58,
and in POM, Introduction, passim.
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fpha Phen omenology7 is, therefore, the pre-
supposition of the Logic in the sense that it
establishes as a truth what Logic assumes at the
start and throughout the system; it proves and
justifies the presuppositions of speculative
Logic 44
The relationship between the Logic and the Phenomenology is a
reciprocal relationship: the Phenomenology
,
by a consideration of all the
forms of truth found in experience, shows the truth contained in the Logic
80
to be the ultimate truth of experience; on the other hand, the Logic is
the abstract and systematic exposition of the final truth which is dis-
covered as a result of the examination of experience in the Phenomen ol ogy
.
The fact should be noted that whether the Logic precedes the Phenomenol-
ogy , or vice versa, is entirely irrelevant; both include the whole of
Hegel's system, although from different aspects. The Phenomenology in
eludes the whole of Hegel* s system from the point of view of the concrete
forms of actual experience; the Logic includes the whole from the point
45
of view of its ultimate form. But the Phenomenology remains as the
empirical justification of the abstract content of the Logic * The con-
tent of the Phenomenology is essentially the content of the Logic, and the
46
process of experience is, at its foundation, a logical process.
The point to be noted here is that, while the Phen omen ol ogy may
44. Baillie, OSHL, 211. Baillie speaks of the Phenomenology as a
"critique of experience", but it is more accurate to view it as a "des-
cription of experience"; for Hegel does not attempt to clear away all
preceding views and build up a system of his own, but, on the contrary,
he asserts that every thinker has made some contribution to thought. Cf.
Baillie, OSHL, 212.
45. Cf. Baillie* s treatment of the relationship between the Logic
and the Phenomenology in OSHL, 208-215.
46. Hegel, POM, 44-45.
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be regarded as a vital part of Hegel* s system, it has as its aim the
demonstration of certain fundamental principles which Hegel conceived
should be maintained in any true philosophy. As a result of the study,
Hegel finds that experience will corroborate his assumptions, and there-
fore he is justified in the more abstract and systematic exposition of
these assumptions, together with the essential method of all thinking, in
his Logic,
A study of the introduction to the Phenomenology will disclose
Hegel's fundamental presuppositions.
The most fundamental assumption of Hegel is that the ultimate
reality, the Absolute, that upon which all else depends, is Mind, or
47
Spirit ( Geist ) . In the introduction to the Phenomen ology , Hegel says:
The Absolute of Hegel is not conceived of as an impersonal,
objective being like the Absolute of Schelling, nor is it an infinite
Substance like that of Spinoza, For Hegel, the Absolute is personal
Sp iri
t
; a living, self-conscious personality which he constantly de-
notes as "Subject", It is the same as the "self-active Reason" of
Aristotle, It is not to be supposed that Hegel means by Absolute
Reason merely the subjective reason, for he identifies the Absolute with
49
God. Human reason is but the highest manifestation of the Absolute
Reason, For Hegel, the only explanation for consciousness is active
47. Baillie, OSHL, 137. 49. Hegel, Bncyclopadie, 156.
48. Hegel, POM, I, 15.
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consciousness or reason, and his Absolute, therefore, is essentially an
ultimate Mind which is conscious of itself as Mind.
In Hegel's view, the two ideas of the Absolute as Mind, and of
the universe as a system, appear united in his philosophy. What he has
in mind is an exposition of absolute truth in such a way that the entire
universe will be seen to have its ground in the unfolding development of
the Absolute Reason,
The systematic development of truth in
scientific form can alone be the true shape
in which truth exists. To help bring phil-
osophy nearer to the form of science - that
goal where it can lay aside the name of love
of knowledge and be actual knowledge - that
is what I have set before me.
The following passage quoted from the Phenomenol ogy contains
within it not only Hegel's conception of the Absolute, but also contains
the concomitants of that conception, Hegel writes:
The living substance. ..is that being which
is truly subject, or what is the same thing, is
truly realized and actual solely in the process
of positing itself, or in mediating with its own
self its transitions from one state or position
to the opposite. As subject it is pure and
simple negativity, and just on that account a
process of splitting up what is simple and un-
differentiated, a process of duplicating and
setting factors in opposition, which in turn is
the negation of this indifferent diversity and
the opposition of factors it entails. True
reality is merely this process of re-instating
self-identity, or reflecting into its own self
in and from its other, and is not an original
and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity
50. Hegel, POM, 5.

83
as such. It is the process of its own becoming,
the circle which presupposes its own end or its
purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it
becomes concrete and actual only by being carried
out, and by the end it involves,
...Per se , the divine life is no doubt un-
disturbed identity and oneness with itself, •••
But this "per se" is an abstract generality, where
we abstract from its real nature which consists
in its being objective to itself, conscious of
itself on its own account; and where consequently
we neglect altogether the self-movement which is
the formal character of its activity. If the form
is declared to correspond to the essence, it is
just for that reason a misunderstanding to suppose
that knowledge can be content with the "per se",
the essence, but can do without the form. ...Pre-
cisely because the form is as necessary to the
essence as the essence to it, absolute reality
must not be conceived of and expressed as essence
alone, i.e. as immediate substance, or as pure
self-intuition of the Divine, but as form also,
and with the entire wealth of the developed form.
Only then is it grasped and expressed as really
actual. The truth is the whole. The whole, how-
ever, is merely the essential nature reaching its
completeness through the process of its own de-
velopment. 51
A careful study of the above passage will reveal the basic pre-
suppositions of the Hegelian logic, and therefore of Hege^s system as a
whole. They may be summarized briefly as follows:
(1) Reality is Absolute Mind, or Heason. By this is meant that
the Absolute is not only of the nature of mind, but is personal, self-
conscious mind as well.
(2) The true is the whole. By this Hegel means that no state-
ment about an object can be called true until the statement is as ade-
51. Hegel, POM, 16-17.
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quate and as coherent as possible. Truth, for Hegel, means adequacy,
and his primary objection to syllogistic logic, and to the transcendental
logic of Kant is that they are inadequate to the task of revealing truth.
In his discussion of Aristotelian logic in his History of Philosophy
,
Hegel sayss
But here we come across the drawback per-
taining to the whole Aristotelian manner, as
also to all succeeding logic - and that indeed
in the highest degree - that in thought and the
movement of thought as such, the individual
moments fall asunder; there are a number of
kinds of judgment and conclusion, each of which
is held to be independent, and to have absolute
truth as such. ...In this isolation they have,
however, no truth; for their totality alone is
the truth of thought. ...Aristotle is thus the
originator of the logic of the understanding;
its forms concern only the relationship of finite
to finite and in them the truth cannot be grasped.
•••His logic really requires recasting, so that
all his determinations should be brought into a
necessary systematic whole - ...one living
organic whole, in which each part is held to be
a part, and the whole alone as such is true, 54
(3) The true is concrete, not abstract, Hegel continually em-
phasizes the distinction between the abstract and the concrete, which he
55
uses in a sense peculiar to his philosophy. In Hegel, any object may
be viewed in such a way as to be abstract and isolated; likewise, any
object may be viewed so as to be concrete, A term is abstract for Hegel
52, Note Bncyclopgdie , 305, where Hegel distinguishes truth from
correctness, Cf, his discussion of truth, Bncyclopfldie
,
51-53; also
245, with reference to what he means by "untruth".
53,Hegel, SOL, 62,
54. Hegel, HP, II, 221-223.
55. Cf. Royce, in DPP, 457.
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when it is considered apart from the relationships with which it belongs.
A term is concrete when it is viewed within the whole of which it is a
part. The distinction arises from Hegel's conception of the true as the
whole, and thus a term which is abstract can be untrue because separated
from the whole which makes it true. For example, when dealing with the
moments of the subjective notion, he says:
No complaint is oftener made against the
notion than that it is abstract . Of course it
is abstract, if abstract means that the medium
in which the notion exists is thought in gen-
eral and not the sensible thing in its empirical
concreteness. It is abstract a^go, because the
notion falls short of the idea.
Any term is abstract when it is considered in isolation. Only
when a term includes all its possible relationships to the rest of real-
ity does it become concrete. Thus his distinction between an abstract
universal and a concrete universal . An abstract universal is any gen-
eral concept that is out of the specific connections with which it be-
longs; for example, "man", "hen", etc. A concrete universal is an in-
dividual whole in which the whole dominates all of its parts; for ex-
ample, "a man", "a hen", etc. It should be noted that the terms ab-
stract and concrete are relative terms; the progression of thought is
always from the abstract toward the more concrete. As will be seen, the
most abstract conception possible is that of mere being
,
apart from any
statement as to the nature of such being. But thought is forced, by its
very nature, to move from abstraction toward the more concrete, in which
56. Hegel, Bhcyclopfldie , 295.
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being is seen to involve relationships of various kinds. Any term is
relatively abstract with reference to a more concrete term, and relative-
ly concrete with reference to a more abstract term. Only the Absolute is
truly concrete because it is totality. Hegel has the distinction between
abstract and concrete in mind when he refers to the Absolute as an "ab-
stract generality" if it is conceived of and expressed in abstraction or
isolation from its real nature which consists in its being objective to
57itself, and conscious of itself.
(4) The true is a dialectical development, discovered in ex-
perience. Thinking must start somewhere, and the place where it starts
Hegel calls the thesis . From this point thinking is always forced to
move on to something else which is different from the thesis; this Hegel
calls the antithesis. The interrelation of thesis and antithesis pro-
duces a new whole with entirely new properties, which Hegel calls the
synthesis , and which he considers to be the logically necessary outcome
of the movement of thought. The whole process is called dialectic
,
which will be more completely discussed under Hegel's treatment of the
categories. The process is not wholly and only rational, but empirical
as well, for Hegel discovers its operation in the survey of experience
made in the Phenomenology.
These presuppositions may all be denoted as elements of "the
true". They are not to be considered as distinct from one another, for a
57. Hegel, POM, 16-17.
« t
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study of Hegel's system indicates that they are all aspects of the Ab-
solute Truth, and therefore reappear at every stage of his thought. In
examining the Hegelian treatment of the categories, we shall see that thej
all have a part in the general unfolding of the logical argument, and
that they are in reality inseparable from one another©
( .-I
CHAPTER FOUR
THE HEGET.TAN TREATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES
The term "category" is a term borrowed from the ancient Greek
courts of law. It is derived from the preposition /^To( , down or
against (the latter being basic to the definition of category), and from
the noun o^yop/oc » court or market-place. The word literally signified
an accusation brought against a person, and came to denote a fundamental
proposition of any kind. In ancient usage it was used in two senses:
(1) in a general sense as simply a predication or attribution; and (2)
in a restricted sense, as a term denoting classes of very wide extension.
Ledger '-/ood, in defining category, gives both a "realistic" and
a "conceptualistic" definition of it. In realistic terms, a category may
be defined as "an ultimate and irreducible universal, a universal which
can neither be resolved into nor subsumed under a higher universal".
^
Because this definition tends to remove the categories from the
existential world, an alternative definition is desirable. He therefore
adopts what he calls the "conceptualistic" or "constructional" view of
the categories, which he gives as follows: "A category is a concept of
high generality and wide application fabricated by the mind with direct
or indirect reference to the experiential world and employed by the mind
1. V/ood, AEC, 145.
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in the interpretation of that world".
Bowne defines the categories as "the immanent mental principles
which underlie articulate experience and make it possible". 3 The point
in both of these definitions is that the categories are the norms or
standards by which the mind proceeds in fixing, defining, and relating
its objects. Thought is to a very great extent a relating activity.
Relations are instituted by thought and are objective expressions of
those principles immanent in thought itself. The categories do not exist
among sensations as mental states; they are the form which the mind
gives to its experience in passing from impressions to objects, and in
relating them. The categories, therefore, constitute the framework of
thought and form the content of pure reason.
Categories differ from general concepts by their relation to
what is called a "universe of discourse". Principles withouij which a
given universe of discourse is impossible are categories for that uni-
verse. For example, the physical law of falling bodies is a general con-
cept, but it is not necessary for a physical world. A physical world is
conceivable in which some other law might operate. Space, on the other
hand, is necessary to any conception of the physical world, and therefore
it is a category. Since the categories pertain to the characteristics
of objects which are essential to the very existence of those objects, the
doctrine of the categories has had an important place in every philosophi-
2. Wood, AX, 152.
3. Bowne, TTK, 59.
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cal system, for without them, existence cannot be conceived.
In Aristotle* s collection of extant works, the treatise
Categoriae is usually listed first, and the doctrine of the categories is
everywhere, in his writings, presupposed as established. There has been
must controversy over the essential meaning of the doctrine, for
Aristotle nowhere tells us of any definite principle used in the de-
duction of the categories. 4 But in its form, the doctrine seems to be
a classification of the meanings of (or the things meant by) uncombined
terms. In other words, it is an inventory of the main aspects of reality
5
at least in so far as language takes account of them. The categories
express reality, and not just "concepts'1 or "ideas"
•
Some have thought that Aristotle derived his categories from the
grammar of language, and would support their contention by the fact that
he designates the various categories by parts of speech. A reading of
the Categoriae would seem to indicate that there is some dependence upon
language for the derivation of his categories, but to assert this as a
fact would require a complete knowledge of -a-ristotle^ philosophy of
language. accordingly, regardless of the method by which he obtained
4. Ross, ARI, 22. Cf. Grote, ARI, 76.
5. Cf. 12ST, IV, 7, where they are viewed from a metaphysical stand-
point as defining reality.
6. Cf. Grot*, ARI, 99-100, and his reasons for concurring in the view
of Trendelenburg that Aristotle derived his categories from the grammar
of language, or at least from the distinctions between parts of speech.
Cf. also, Ross, ARI, 22, where he writes: "It is easy to see that
a study of the forms of language was one of Aristotle f s main guides in
the formulation of the doctrine. ...But he had no list of the parts of
speech on which he could base a list of categories; the only parts of
speech which he recognizes as such are the noun and the verb. And the
doctrine of the categories brings together things which grammar sepa-
rates, and separates things which grammar brings together".
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I them, it remains that they are his mode of analyzing the terms of possi-
ble propositions. The number of categories is variously given in
Aristotle's works, but the most common number is ten: Substance, Quanti-
ty, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Action, and Passion.
In terms of parts of speech, under the heading of Substance come nouns,
which may be either the subject or predicate of a proposition; Quantity,
Quality, and Relation are denoted by adjectives which include these
properties; Position, State, Action, and Passion are all forms of the
verb, which is either the predicate of a proposition, or forms part of
7
the predicate.
These categories have been criticized by many thinkers and upon
many differing grounds. Some hold they do not constitute a logical, but
a metaphysical treatise. Others hold that the arbitrary way in which
Aristotle insists upon the number "ten" is not backed up by any good
reason. If the supreme category of Being is carefully considered, says
Hamilton, it will be seen that Being is not characterized by these ten
and no more, nor is it possible to characterize the ten categories as
being separate and distinct classifications. 8 In addition, he holds
that the first category, Substance, may be considered as Being-by-itself;
and the rest are but accidents of Substance, and they overlap or flow
into one another depending upon the way in which Substance is being
viewed at the moment. A discussion of these objections would carry us
«
7. In formal logic, the copula is either ignored, or is treated as
part of the predicate.
8. Hamilton, II, 141.
« <
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> too far afield; they may be justified, or they may not. But if we, as
Grote says, seek not to appreciate the value of the ten categories as a
philosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind of
a
Aristotle when he framed them, we shall see that his analysis of the
categories depended upon an acceptance of a concrete individual as he
stands, with his full array of possible predicates embodied in proposi-
tions, and he proceeds to analyze these propositions into their logical
constituents* The categories derive their existence from being attached
to a Subject, a concrete individual, and each one has a different mode of
existence according as they are differently related to that Subject. For
example
:
What is this individual, Sokrates? He is
an animal. What is his Species? Man. What is
the Differentia, limiting the Genus and con-
stituting the Species? nationality, two-footed-
ness. What is his height and bulk? He is six
feet high, and is of twelve-stone weight. What
manner of man is he? He is flat-nosed, virtuous,
patient, brave. In what relation does he stand
to others? He is a father, a proprietor, a
citizen, a general. "What is he doing? He is
digging his garden, ploughing his field. What
is being done to him? He is being rubbed with oil,
he is having his hair cut. Where is he? In the
city, at home, in bed. When do you speak of him?
As he is, at this moment, as he was, yesterday,
last year. In what posture is he? He is lyiag
down, sitting, standing up, kneeling, balancing
on one leg. What is he wearing? He has a tunic,
armour, shoes, gloves . ^
The significance of this quotation is its illustration of the
fact that, whatever a person or thing with which we are dealing, it
9* Grote, ARI, 78.
10. Ibid., 77.

falls necessarily under each of the ten categories; it belongs to a
certain genus, to a certain species; it is of a certain bulk and height;
it has certain qualities; it stands in certain relations to other things;
it is either doing something or suffering something; it is located in a
certain place; it must be described in terms of a certain time; it is
in a certain attitude or posture; and it is clothed or equipped in a
certain manner. In other words, the categories apply to concrete indiv-
iduals. Aristotle is not dealing with mere abstractions here; he in-
tends to deal with reality also. The first distinction set forth in the
Categoriae is that between matters predicated of a subject and matters
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predicated in a subject. The important thing to note is that a subject
is requisite to the whole discussion.^" The subjects are concrete, in-
dividual things or persons, such as Socrates, this man, that dog, etc.
Substance, or Essence, in its complete state as concrete, individual, and
determinate, is an embodiment of all these ten categories, the first
being the subject of which the rest are predicated. Whatever question
can be asked concerning any individual subject, the subject will fall
under these ten categories.
The categories of Aristotle, therefore, may be defined as
classifications, a posteriori , of the modes of objective or real exist-
ence. As such, they are not part of his logic, although they are pre-
supposed by it. They are considered by Aristotle as "various meanings of
being",
^
2 and as such they form a list of the fundamental kinds of real-
11. Aristotle, Categoriae
,
I, a24.
12. Aristotle, MET, IV, 7.
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ities with which the metaphysician must deal. Their significance for
logic, however, lies in the fact that these categories, formulated into
logical propositions, have a definite reference to reality. For Aristotle
logic is not purely formal, in the sense of being apart from reality, as
is often commonly supposed. It is true that logic deals with propositions
in their abstract construction as forms by which the mind seeks truth,
but as far as Aristotle *s construction of the science is concerned, it is
13
not something set apart from concrete reality.
Among the most interesting tables of categories is the Kantian.
Kant, in opposition to the Greek view, held that the objects of thought
are nothing but the products of thought itself. Accordingly, over
against the analytic logic of Aristotle he set his synthetic logic , in
which the categories are regarded as the relating forms by which objects
of thought arise. Kant used the categories to denote the a priori cog-
nOtions, or forms of thought, which are native and necessary to the mind
itself, and which are not contingently derived from experience by an a
posteriori process of generalization.
Thus, as Mary Calkins says:
The Categories for Kant are the results of
the mind's activity, - or better, they are
activities of the mind. ...The Categories are,
furthermore, like space and time relations, &
pri ori , that is, independent of sense experience,
universal and necessary. 4
It is important to distinguish the "transcendental logic" of
13. Cf. Grote, ARI, 108, where he notes that in both the Categoriae
and De Interpretatione ontology is implicated with logic.
14. Calkins, PPP, 205.

Kant from the analytic logic of Aristotle, Knowledge for Kant is a syn-
thesis, by which he means the "act of arranging different representations
together, and of comprehending what is manifold in them under one form of
knowledge",
^
5 The synthesis includes both that which is given empiri-
cally given by sense, and that given a priori by the understanding. But
when the empirical is separated out of the synthesis, what is left is
pure synthesis , which "in its most general meaning gives us the pure con-
16
cept of the understanding". These pure concepts of the understanding
refer a priori to objects, and they are called "pure concepts of the
understanding" because
•••the same understanding, and by the same
operations by which in concepts it achieves
through analytical unity the logical form of
a judgment, introduces also, through the syn-
thetical unity of the manifold in intuition,
a transcendental element into its represent-
ations,^7
Borrowing the term from Aristotle, Kant calls these pure concepts
of the understanding categories. The defects of Aristotelian analytic
TO
logic are recognized by Kant in his own transcendental logic, yet he
accepted one thing in common with Aristotelian logic - the science of
judgment . Upon the traditional table of judgments he bases his table of
the categories. Understanding by category the object of thought, he
argues that all thought is judgment, and therefore there must be as many
sorts of categories as there are sorts of judgments. Thus, Kant says:
15. Kant, CPR, 64,
16. Ibid., 65.
17. Ibid., 66,
18. Cf, Smith, CKCPR, 184-185, where he lists the defects of trad-
itional logic in detail, and also shows how Kant's final result is far
from his professed reliance upon it.
( <
As all acts of the understanding can be
reduced to judgments, the understanding may be
defined as the faculty of judging * •••The
functions of the understanding can be dis-
covered in their completeness, if it is
possible to represent the functions of unity
in judgments
.
The deduction of the Kantian categories rests therefore upon the
general principle that all acts of the understanding are judgments, and
that the possible ultimate a priori forms of the understanding are ident-
ical with the traditional forms of judgment. Thus the categories of Kant
appear as follows: 2^
1. Quantity
Judgments
a. Universal
b. Particular
c. Individual
2. Quality
Judgments
a. Affirmative
b. Negative
c. Infinite
3. Relation
Judgments
a. Categorical
b. Hypothetical
Co Disjunctive
4. Modality
Judgments
a. Problematic
b» Assert oric
c. Apodictic
Categories
a* Unity
b. Multiplicity
c. Totality
Categories
a. Reality
b. Negation
c. Limitation
Categories
a. Inherence & Subsistence
(Substance & Accident)
b» Causality & Dependence
c. Reciprocity
Categories
a. Possibility & Impossibil-
ity
b. Existence & Non-existence
c. Necessity & Contingency
19. Kant, CPR, 57.
20. Cf. Ibid., 58, and 66-67.

It is to be noted here that Kant considered this table of the
categories to be complete; he always has exactly twelve categories) no
more, no less.
There arise exactly so many pure concepts
of the understanding which refer a priori to
objects of intuition in general, as there were
in our table logical functions in all possible
judgments, because these functions completely
exhaust the understanding, and comprehend every
one of its faculties. 21
But Kant's deduction of the categories is open to serious ob-
jections. "This principle of classification, as has been objected to by
most of Kant's critics, is at fault in the following way: it too un-
critically assumes the adequacy of traditional logic to express all the
22
metaphysically important classes of judgments" • Kant placed too
great a reliance upon the finality of the traditional classification of
judgments. While Kant maintained that the table was complete, he was
forced to make changes in the table of judgments in order to make it
yield the categories he felt were required. Thus Smith characterizes
Kant's "deduction" of the categories as "laboured, arbitrary, and self-
24
contradictory". Their construction is therefore artificial, loose in
the relations between the forms of judgment and the categories, and the
categories themselves are therefore unequal in value. All of these con-
siderations make their "deduction" by Kant invalid.
The metaphysical implication of Kant's categories are important,
21. Kant, CPR, 66.
22. Calkins, PPP, 553.
23. Cf. Smith's treatment of the category of Quantity, CKCPR, 184.
24. Ibid., 191.

especially in relation to the categories of Kegel. Since the categories
are only the mental forms for relating and are in themselves empty, they
can refer to an object only through the medium of perceptions. In other
words, the only object of human knowledge is phenomenal appearance, and
Kant's metaphysics can be only a metaphysics of phenomena . Only what
appears can be known, for phenomena appear so because of the creative
construction by the a priori categories of the understanding. Knowledge
of "things-in-themselves" is impossible. The sole reason for asserting
the categories to be valid throughout experience is that they are in-
25dispensably necessary for rendering it possible.
Comparing the categories of Aristotle and of Kant, we find that
the main difference between them is to be found in the fact that "Kant
starts from the subjective side, considering the categories first as
forms of conscious judging, whereas Aristotle - herein followed by Hegel -
regards the categories as relations of the objects of knowledge". 26 The
criticism Hegel applies to the "metaphysics of the past"27 applies also
to the categories of Kant. "It entertains an unquestioning belief that
reflection is the means of ascertaining the truth, and of bringing ob-
jects before the mind as they really are".w In other words, as a meta-
physics, such a mode of thought took the laws and forms of thought to be
the fundamental laws and forms of things, and assumed that a knowledge of
the Absolute could be acquired by assigning the categories of thought to
25. Smith, CKCPR, 260.
26. Calkins, PPP, 553.
27. Hegel, Bncyclopgdie, 60-75. He refers here to the metaphysics
of Wolff.
28. Ibid., 60.
c<
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it* Hegel objects to this type of metaphysics on the ground that it
"never went beyond the province of the analytic understanding. Without
preliminary inquiry it adopted the abstract categories of thought and let
29them rank as predicates of truth". Such categories are, therefore,
purely analytic, external predicates which are applied in a purely extern-
al relation to reality. The categories in such a case are not expressions
of the truth (the whole of reality), but are only limited formulae of the
understanding which merely impose a limit upon reality. They treat real-
ity as simple, whereas it is complex. To have a genuine cognition of
reality, the object of thought must characterize its own self, and not
derive its predicates from without.
In the case of the Kantian categories, they are subjective, and
they absorb into their meaning all that is ordinarily meant by object-
ivity. While Kant characterizes them as synthetic, the synthesis is
still only an external relation to reality - the synthesis has not been
carried far enough. In common with Empiricism, the critical philosophy of
Kant emphasizes the great principle that whatever is true must be in the
actual world and present to sense. But this emphasis, it must be remem-
bered, results in a denial of the super-sensible, or at least a denial of
any knowledge of it which would define its nature. It leaves thought no
powers except those of abstraction and formal universality and identity*
The emphasis is upon analysis which, far from leaving objects as they
appear in experience, really transforms objects which are concrete into
29, He^el, Bncyplopadie, 62,
cc
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mere abstractions. Thus, while such a view does establish the differ-
ences in things, these differences are nothing but abstract attributes, or
thoughts.
These thoughts, it is assumed, contain the
real essence of the objects, and thus once more
we see the axiom of by-gone metaphysics reappear,
that the truth of things lies in thought. 30
It follows that the categories are no fit terms for the express-
ion of the Absolute, "the Absolute not being given in perception; - and
Understanding, or knowledge by means of the categories, is consequently
31incapable of knowing the Things-in-themselves".
Hegel assigns to Kant's philosophy one negative merit: it em-
phasizes the fact that the categories of understanding are finite in
their range, and that any cognitive process confined to them falls short
of revealing the truth.
But Kant had only a sight of half the
truth. He explained the finite nature of the
categories to mean that they were subjective
only, valid only for our thought, from which
the thing-in-itself was divided by an impass-
able gulf. In fact, however, it is not because
they are subjective, that the categories are
finite; they are finite by their very nature,
and it is on their own selves that it is requis-
ite to exhibit their finitude.32
Kant f s mistake lay in assuming that truth can be contained with-
in the scope of the categories of the understanding, and the result was
I
30. Hegel, Encyclopedia, 80.
31. Ibid., 91.
32. Ibid., 119.
r
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that he produced only a historical description of thought; a mere
enumeration of the factors of consciousness* The enumeration may be
correct, but the universal necessity of what is thus empirically brought
33
together is nowhere demonstrated conclusively. Kant's conclusion is
justified in so far as all finite thinking is concerned with appearances;
but for Hegel the terminus of thought is not the phenomenal world - there
is another and higher region which Kant's system made inaccessible to him.
The lack of a principle sufficient to secure the exhaustiveness
of the table of categories led Hegel, among others, to attempt to deduce
a table of categories from some single principle constitutive of the
thinking process and of reality as a whole. 34
Hegel conceived that three fundamental principles should hold of
all philosophy:
...that it should be the complete expos-
ition of the knowledge of the Absolute, that
the system of such knowledge should be deter-
mined by the inner connexion of its content,
and that the nature of the Absolute should be
shown to be Mind, Spirit (Geist). 35
These principles are for Hegel fundamental assumptions which
must be held by those who seek to fulfill the task of philosophy. If it
is true that all that is real or actual is the manifestation of the Ab-
solute Spirit or Mind, then metaphysics coincides with logic. Logic thus
has as its purpose the exhibition of the development of the creative
33. Cf. Smith, CKCPR, 360.
34. Royce, in DPP, 453.
35. Baillie, OSHL, 119.
e
self-movement of Spirit as a dialectical necessity. The conceptions into
which Mind or Spirit takes apart and analyzes its own content are the
categories of reality; the task of philosophy is to comprehend these
categories as moments of a single, necessary, unitary development. In
this are the categories of Hegel to be sharply distinguished from those
of Aristotle and Kant. Hegel* s method is synthetic as over against the
analytic method of both Aristotle and Kant.
Aristotle^ categories were characterized by no principle of
necessity in their deduction, and were applied externally to reality.
Kant, on the other hand, in applying the categories to reality, made
reality subjective, and his deduction of the categories was characterized
as necessary only to the extent to which the categories made knowledge
possible. Objective knowledge was something apart from the knowledge the
categories give us. But Hegel* s conception of truth as the whole makes
such categories untrue. Thus Hegel says:
If the thought-forms are vitiated by a
fixed antithesis, i.e . if they are only of a
finite character, they are unsuitable for the
self-centred universe of truth, and truth can
find no adequate receptacle in thought. Such
thought, which can produce only limited and
partial categories and proceed by their means,
is what in the stricter sense of the word is
termed understanding. The finitude, further,
of these categories lies in two points. Firstly,
they are only subjective, and the antithesis of
an objective clings permanently to them.
Secondly, they are always of restricted con-
tent, and so persist in antithesis to one
another and still more to the Absolute. 36
36. Hegel, Bncyclopadie , 58.

Criticism of the forms of common understanding has the result
that these forms "have no applicability to things-in-themselves. This
can have no other meaning than that the Forms are in themselves untrue"??
If the fundamental assumptions of Hegelian philosophy are to be
demonstrated, therefore, new categories characterized by two requirements
must be found: (1) they must give expression to the natural movement of
subjective thought; and (£) they must be definitions of objective reality
as well. In addition, the categories must be determined by a method
which will show conclusively that they follow from necessity, both from
the nature of thought and also from the nature of reality. This method,
then, in the light of the above-mentioned fundamental assumptions must
accomplish three things: (1) it must be a method which will result in a
complete exposition of the Absolute; (2) it must be a method which will
show the nature of the Absolute to be mind; and (3) it must be a method
which will show the entire system of philosophy to be determined by the
inner connection of its content.
In beginning the logic proper, Hegel points out that the cate-
gories of the logic "may be looked upon as definition of the Absolute, or
metaphysical definitions of God". By a "metaphysical definition",
Hegel means that the categories of the logic are the expression of God's
nature in thought as such* Every category, therefore, is to be evaluated
in terms of its being one aspect of the Absolute, or universal Reason, and
37. Hegel, SOL, 67.
38. Hegel, Bncyclopfldie , 156.
r( c
on that account as necessary to the whole* Hegel's categories are to be
set over against the arbitrary, subjective categories of Kant, Since the
categories are the definition of the objective Reason in the world, they
are not, strictly speaking, so much "deduced" by Hegel as "discovered 1* by
him. Hegel's deduction, therefore, is the discovery of the nature, order,
and connection of the system of Reason which objectively is,
Stace points out that there are two questions confronting Hegel
at the very beginning: What is to be the starting-point, i.e., the first
category; and, what method is to be used to obtain the other categories
39
from this first one? If the deduction of the categories is to be
shown to be logically necessary, the first category cannot be any arbi-
trary choice taken at random; since the categories are the objective
process of reality itself, and since by "reality" universal Reason is
40
meant, it follows that the first category must be first necessarily.
It is the category logically prior to all the others: the category of
Being,
Hegel arrives at this category simply by examining his own
reason and seeing which of all universal and necessary concepts is pre-
supposed by, and logically prior to, all the others, "Pure Being", he
says, "makes the beginning: because it is on the one hand pure thought,
and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; and the
41
first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined".
104
39, Stace, POH, 84.
40, Hegel, gacyclopadle, 173,
41, Ibid., 158.
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Mediation for Hegel implies advance from an immediate idea through its
antithesis to its synthesis, and henoe the primary category must be en-
tirely unmediated. With regard to concepts in general, the principle
holds that the more universal is logically prior to the less universal,
so that the latter is subsumed under the former. In other words, the
more abstract and general a category, the earlier will be its position in
the logic. The first category will be the most general of all. The
starting-point of Hegel's logic is, therefore, the category of Being, for
the concept of Being is the highest possible abstraction. 42 It is that
concept which is common to every conceivable object in the universe; that
which contains no determinations of any kind. Whatever object we choose
to think about, it must always be true to say of it that it is. We can
conceive of no object that does not have as one of its characteristics
the category of Being. Being is thus presupposed by, and logically prior
to, all the others, for the others are dependent upon it.
But having determined which category is to be the first, the
problem of how the others are to be deduced from it arises. This problem
is solved by the dialectical method, or by means of the principle of
dialectic*
The principle of dialectic, which Royce calls "the fundamental
paradox of our consciousness"43 is the principle whereby the deduction of
42. It is interesting to note that Hegel begins with the Absolute of
the Sleatics, of Spinoza, and of Schelling. One of the purposes of his
logic is to show the impossibility of such an Absolute; Hegel, Encyclo-
pedia, 158-159. Cf. Harris, HL, 125.
43. Hoyce, 3MP, 203.
r
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the Hegelian categories is accomplished according to logical necessity .
The idea in germ is borrowed from Aristotle's conception of the logical
44priority of the universal. According to Aristotlei the form, or
universal of a thing is also its end or purpose; and since the end or
purpose of a thing is the reason why a thing exists, it is logically
prior to the existence of that thing. The object in the world depends,
logically, upon the universal for its existence* This idea is utilized
by Hegel in the deduction of his categories. To quote Stace:
The universal is the source of all exist-
ence. 3ut the dependence of the world upon the
universal is not a causal, but a logical, depend-
ence. In other words, the world flows from the
universal, not as an effect flows from its cause
in time, but as a conclusion flows from its prem-
iselT^
The method used by Hegel, it should be pointed out, has not been
invented by him} it has been discovered as the logical principle inher-
ent in all reasoning. Deduction of the categories presupposes getting the
higher categories out of the lower ones, and if so they must be contained
in them somehow. They must be connected logically and necessarily by the
very process of reasoning itself. This process Hegel does not invent,
46
but discovers in his analysis of human consciousness in the Phenomenology .
In the introduction to his Science of Logic , Hegel says:
In order that these dead bones of Logic may
be revivified by Mind, and endowed with content
and coherence, its method must be that by means
of which alone Logic is capable of becoming a pure
Science. ...The exposition of that which alone is
capable of being the true method of philosophic
Science belongs to Logic itself. ... since method
44. Stace, POH, 21.
45. Ibid., 22.
46. Hegel, Bncyclopfldie , 58„
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is the consciousness of the form taken by the
inner spontaneous movement of the content of
Logic. In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have
set out an example of this method as applied
to a more concrete object, namely, to conscious-
ness. We have here modes of consciousness each
of which in realizing itself abolishes itself,
has its own negation as its result, - and thus
passes over into a higher mode* The one and
only thing for securing scientific progress.
- is knowledge of the logical precept that
Negation is just as much Affirmation as Ne-
gation, or that which is self-contradictory
resolves itself not into nullity, into abstract
Nothingness, but essentially only into the ne-
gation of its particular content, that such ne-
gation is not an all-embracing Negation, but is
the negation of a definite somewhat which abol-
ishes itself, and thus is a definite negation,
it has a content. It is a new concept, but a
higher, richer concept than that which preceded;
for it has been enriched by the negation or
opposite of that preceding concept, and thus
contains it, but contains also more than it,
and is the unity of it and its opposite. 47
In this passage, two important considerations are to be noted.
The first is: the principle that all negation is determination is basic
to the whole method of Hegel. Spinoza had laid down the principle that
43
all determination is negation; and while, as Stace points out, formal
logicians will remind us that Spinoza's proposition cannot be simply con-
verted, negation is, as a matter of experience, the very essence of pos-
itive being*49 "A thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its
47. Hegel, SOL, 64-65. The Phenomenology is Hegel's survey of ex-
perience; the basic experience out of whch Hegel derives his system is
the experience of love. Dr. Brightman, in a Seminar in Hegel's Logic at
Boston University (1946-1947) stated that he attended a lecture in Germany
in which the philosopher Haering had noted this fact. Cf . the interesting
statement in the Phenomenology, where Hegel says : "The life of God and
divine intelligence, then, can, if we like, be spoken of S3 love disport-
ing with itself; Hegel, POM, 16-17.
48. Stace, POH, 33. 49. Hegel, Encyclopfldie, 171-173.
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limit". By determination is meant definition , for the German verb
bestinmen includes both meanings, the latter being submerged in its
English equivalent. To define a thing is to set boundaries about it; to
cut it off from some sphere of being, and therefore to limit it. To
affirm that a thing lies within certain limits is to deny that it is out-
side those limits. Whatever is said of a thing by way of setting it
apart always denies something else of it. For Hegel, negation involves
affirmation, and affirmation involves negation, and thus both are correl-
atives which mutually involve each other. If, therefore, all determin-
ation is negation, it follows that the positive nature of a thing con-
sists in its negations. Negation is, therefore, the very essence of pos-
itive being, for nothing can be stated about any object without involving
the rest of the universe in the statement.
In the second place, the primary consideration, with respect to
which negation is of secondary importance, is the fact of the synthesis
of two opposing conceptions. As McTaggart says, "The really fundamental
aspect of the dialectic is not the tendency of the finite category to
51
negate itself but to complete itself".
Kant had discovered that whenever reason attempts to treat the
universe as an object of knowledge, propositions which are mutually con-
tradictory can be maintained with equal right. The analysis of experi-
ence shows that, as soon as the mind attempts to go beyond phenomena,
contradictories always arise in conceptual thinking, which contradictor-
ies
50. Hegel, ffncyclopadie , 173.
51. McTaggart, SHD, 10.
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ies are apparently necessary and irreconcilable, Kant thus says, in his
chapter on "The Antinomy of Pure Reason", "Here we are met by a new phen-
omenon in human reason, namely, a perfectly natural Antithetic, which is
not produced by artificial efforts, but into which reason falls by itself,
and inevitably" • Kant worked out only four of the Antinomies, ° as
he called them, and Hegel criticizes Kant at this point for, as he says,
"the Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken from
Cosmology; they appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions,
54
notions, and Ideas"* However, Kant did render a service to philosophy
for he showed that the contradictions of thought spring directly from the
necessity of the human mind itself* The antitheses and contradictions of
thought belong to the nature of mind itself, and thus also to the essen-
tial nature of the reality which unfolds from it. Thus Hegel says,
The problem of these Antinomies is no mere
subjective piece of work oscillating between one
set of grounds and another; it really serves to
show that every abstract proposition of under-
standing, taken precisely as it is given, natur-
ally veers round into its opposite,^5
In addition, this characteristic of thought is universal in its
operation, for Hegel emphasizes that "wherever there is movement, wherever
there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual
56
world, there Dialectic is at work".
-
52. Kant, CPR, 329,
53. Cf, Smith, CKCPR, 432, 519-520; Kant, CPR, 328-378.
54. Hegel, Encyclopfldie, 99.
55. Ibid., 149.
56. Ibid., 148.
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Kant was able to give no solution to this "problem of oppos-
57
ites", and it was left for Hegel to show, in his Logic, that the truth
of opposites consists in the systematic connection in which the categor-
ies follow from one another. Bach receives its true value only when it
is connected with the rest and is introduced into the whole. The dia-
lectical method serves, with Hegel, to determine the essential nature of
such opposing particular phenomena by the significance which they have
as moments or links in the self-unfolding of the Absolute Reason.
The opposites are not illusion, neither
is unity illusion. The opposites are opposed
to one another, but they are not opposed to
unity. For true and concrete unity is nothing
but the unity, or synthesis of opposites. It
is not immobility, it is movement. It is not
fixity, but development. 58
Hegel regards unity and opposition as one-sided truths or frag-
ments which merge into a synthesis, in which all three disappear, and a
new unity with completely new characteristics appears. The dialectic is
a movement, an evolution, of the "moments" of the Absolute totality, and
the relation involved between them in the development of the new unity in
the synthesis Hegel refers to by the German verb aufheben, which means
that the moments are not only abolished, but at the same time preserved
in a higher unity.
Logic is therefore the center of the Hegelian system. It is
"neither more nor less than an expansion, completion and rectification of
57. Cf. Smith, CKCPR, 432.
58. Croce, POH, 19-80.

Ill
Kant*s table of the categories. In other words, it is a systematic
grammar of thought - an analysis of the nature of our general conceptions
59
and of their relations to one another"
•
The operation of dialectic can be seen by examining Hegel*
s
treatment of the Category of Being, Dialectic involves a process of med-
iation; a process by which an idea in its immediacy is overcome by
reflection upon the idea and the mind moves toward the unity and com-
pleteness of the Absolute Idea by mastering the steps of mediation and
removing them. Any idea of the mind, when first siezed upon, is lacking
in relations to other ideas. Reflection upon a simple idea present to
the mind discovers these relations one by one, and thus its structure is
revealed. The act of reflection is the process of mediation, the move-
ment of the dialectic, and is necessary and universal to all thought.
Mediating is nothing but self-identity
working itself out through an active, self-
directed process. ...It is pure negativity,
or, reduced to its utmost abstraction, a
process of bare and simple becoming. ...We
misconceive.. .the nature of reason if we ex-
clude reflection or mediation from ultimate
truth, and do not take it to be a moment of
the Absolute. 60
The true nature of thought is not to be found in its abstract
forms, separated from the process of thought; the true nature of
thought is a process in which thought is forced on to a knowledge of the
59. Seth, HP, 89.
60. Hegel, POM, 18-19.
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whole.
Hegel starts with the category of Being, because, as was pointed
61
out above, it is the simplest and most abstract of all possible cate-
gories. It has no character, and is entirely empty. But as such, it is
equal to Nothing, for we can think of an object only by virtue of this
or that determination. It is only by means of definite characteristics
that an object can exist for thought. Since Being, by its very defini-
tion, is the absence of all determination, it is Nothing. Being and
Nothing are therefore identical, and each passes into its opposite; a
process which Hegel term Becoming. 6^ But Becoming is the unity of Being
and Nothing, and therefore, because of their identity, both cease to pass
into each other. But this means that Becoming has collapsed into a unity
of Being and Nothing, What we now have is a Being which does not become;
a Being which does not at any time pass over into its opposite. As such,
we can no longer say of it that it merely is; now it definitely is. It
is determinate Being. "It is the definiteness of the Being which con-
63 m
stitutes the new category". Thus Hegel has arrived at the conception of
a Being which has determination, although this determination is only the
general idea of determination as such. The transition from this idea of
abstract determination is now before us; "Determinate Being is Being
with a character or mode - which simply la} and such un-mediated char-
64
acter is Quality".
61. Cf. 104-105.
62. Hegel, JSncyclopfldie, 163.
63. Stace, POH, 139.
64. Hegel, Bncyclopfldie, 170.
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Quality, as the result of the process of thought, becomes the
new starting-point from which the process of mediation continues as be-
fore. Thus, each category in the Hegelian system is evolved out of the
preceding one, and each category is the unity of what precedes. Thought
always begins with an idea immediately present to the mind. This idea is
immediate, in Hegel's sense of the term, because it is perceived as a
65
simple idea apart from its relations. But whenever one thinks he is
forced to go from the immediate idea to something else; he is forced to
consider the neighboring territory, or, as Hegel terms it, its "other". 66
Thus, over against the thesis with which thought begins, there is the
antithesis , or opposite. The two ideas are now externally related to
each other as contradictories. The contradiction can only be overcome by
including both in a more comprehensive concept, the synthesis . V/hen this
is done, the synthesis becomes a new thesis, which passes over into its
antithesis, and both are once again included in a further synthesis.
This process continues until thought has reached the Absolute Idea, which
is seen to be the totality of all thought; the stage of thought at
which all contradiction has been overcome, yet preserved, in the all-
embracing unity of the whole. In each case, therefore, thought begins
with a simple, immediate idea, and a new category is evolved when
thought is forced to go beyond mere immediacy and to consider the ex-
ternal and internal relations of that idea.
65. Cf. Hegel, ffncyclopaaie
, 158, where he says, "the first be-
ginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined".
66. Ibid., 159.

114
This evolution, or development, of thought is the essence of the
Hegelian dialectic* The deduction involved in the system is not the
syllogistic deduction of formal logic; it is the demonstration of each
category as belonging to, or being a member of, a whole* As such a whole
it is not a class-whole, as is the case with syllogistic logic, but an
organic whole including in itself all the relations existent in reality.
By this method of deduction Hegel deduces his categories, with their sub-
categories, as a logical necessity resulting from the very nature of the
thought-process itself. There are three of these categories:
(1) The Category of Sein (Being), with the sub-categories of
Quality, Quantity, and Measure, This is the stage of immediacy , the
area of sensation (Sinnlichkeit) •
(2) The Category of Wesen (Essence), with the sub-categories of
Ground of Bxistence, Appearance, and Actuality, This is the stage of
external relations , the area of the understanding (Verstand ) , It is on
this level that Kant*s categories are properly located. They do not in-
volve the inner connection of reality, but only the external relations of
an
thought to reality. They deal with finite thinking, and are concerned
with appearance only. But Hegel recognizes that the stage of appearance -
the phenomenal world - is not the terminus of thought; there is another
and higher region. This corresponds to Hegel* s third category:
(3) The Category of Begriff (Concept) , with the sub-categories
of Subject, Object, and Idea, This is the stage of internal relations,
67, Cf, Hegel, Bncyclopfldie, 119.
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the area of reason (vernunft). This is the stage of philosophic adequacy,
of the comprehension of the whole.
Thought, therefore, is a dialectical development from the area
of sensation and immediacy through the area of external relations to the
area of internal relations; it is a dialectical development from the ab-
stract to the more concrete, finding its completion in the Absolute Idea,
which is wholly concrete because it is totality* The various categories
of human thought - Quality, Quantity, Measure, Form, Content, Causality,
etco - all are stages in the self-expression of our thought-activity.
Each category, however, is not the whole - is not the truth* Bach one is
a necessary, but abstract and untrue, expression of the total nature of
things. Bach category is the truth, but it is not the whole truth, Sach
is a definition of the Absolute (God), but it is not the whole definition
of the Absolute, The last category expresses the truth only in so far
as it explicitly includes in itself the totality of all the other cate-
gories. To remain on any lower level of thought without moving in
thought toward the Absolute Idea is to remain on a level which is inade-
quate as an expression of the truth. The progression of thought must be
from the abstract to the more concrete, and is more concrete only as it
approaches the totality of the Absolute Idea.
Logic, then, Hegel defines as "the science of the pure Idea;
69
pure, that is, because the Idea is in the abstract medium of thought". ww
Logic is abstract because it is devoid of everything but the principles
68. Cf, Hegel, Bncyclopfldie, 156, 207.
69, Ibid., 30,

of thought. But although abstract, it is a logic of concreteness. It is
abstract and yet concrete because it has been abstracted from the concrete
experience of the Phenomenology ,
But Hegel has stated that logic is "able to express the reality
of things"
•
70
If logic is the science of the pure (abstract) Idea, how
can it explain the essential nature of reality?
Royce says that in the JBncyclopfldie Hegel appears "as one
attempting, like a modern Aristotle, the task of surveying the total
result of human knowledge with reference to its unification in terms of
71
an idealistic philosophy". And such a survey was the result of his
examination of experience in the Phenomenology , for when Hegel examined
experience in the light of his proposed method for philosophy (dialectic),
he found that he could not remain solely in the realm of subjective
thought. Thus, he says,
In my Phenomenology of the Spirit, which
•••was at its publication described as the first
part of the System of Philosophy, the method
adopted was to begin with the first and simplest
phase of mind, immediate consciousness, and to
show how that stage gradually of necessity worked
onward to the philosophical point of view, the
necessity of that view being proved by the pro-
cess. But in these circumstances it was im-
possible to restrict the quest to the mere form
of consciousness. For the stage of philosophical
knowledge is the richest in material and organi-
sation, and therefore, as it comes before us in
the shape of a result, it presupposed the exist-
ence of the concrete formations of consciousness,
such as individual and social morality, art and
70. Hegel, ESncyclopadie , 30.
71. Royce, D£L, 214.

religion. In the development of consciousness,
which at first sight appears limited to the point
of form only, there is thus at the same time in-
cluded the development of the matter or of the
objects discussed in the special branches of
philosophy. 72
Hegel's categories, therefore, are not a collection of isolated
ideas which are found in the mind and applied, now one and now another,
to reality (vs. Kant). They are not instruments which the mind uses , but
elements of a whole in the unity of which the mind is. The movement in
the logic is to trace the categories, logically in the abstract, up to
ntz
the category of Absolute Idea, or self-consciousness. ° This is the
organic unity of all the other categories, all of which are deduced from
a single principle - the self. Thus thought reaches intelligence both as
the principle of unity in the world, and also as the empirical process by
means of which that principle can be traced out in reality. 74
The logic is purely a logic - it is not a metaphysics. It deals
with abstract universals, with pure thought. The Absolute Idea of the
logic is merely the "scheme or form of self-consciousness. 7^ But in the
Philosophy of Mind Hegel goes on to deal with realities, with facts of
experience. Thus the Absolute Spirit is shown to be the one ultimately
real existence of which the Absolute Idea of the logic is a description
76
or definition. The logic is not merely a logic of subjective thought;
72. Hegel, iincyclopgdie , 58-59.
73. Cf. Ibid., 287 , where Hegel refers to the Absolute Idea as "the
principle of all life ^rhich/ thus possesses. ..a character of thorough
concreteness".
74. Royce, LMI, 157.
75. Seth, HP, 109.
76. Cf. Hegel, Bncyclopfldle, Sec. 553.
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it is an absolute logic, and therefore at the same time it describes not
only the forms of subjective thought, but the forms of objective reality
as well.
The facts of experience are shown to be the concrete expressions
of the abstract principles of the logic. "The concrete existence of the
categories (in Nature and Spirit) is to be deduced from their essence or
77
thought-nature; it is to be shown that they cannot not be".
The point of departure of such an idealistic philosophy is ex-
78
perience. From this point thought moves first toward the abstract, and
then toward the concrete manifestation of the abstract in experience.
Awakened, as it were, by this stimulus /ex-
perience/, thought is vitally characterised by
raising itself above the natural state of mind,
above the senses and inferences from the senses
into its own unadulterated element, and by
assuming, accordingly, at first a stand-aloof
and negative attitude towards the point from
which it started. Through this state of an-
tagonism to the phenomena of sense its first
satisfaction is found in itself, in the Idea
of the universal essence of these phenomena:
as Idea (the Absolute or God) which may be more
or less abstract. Meanwhile, on the other hand,
the sciences, based on experience, exert upon
the mind a stimulus to overcome the form in
which their varied contents are presented, and
to elevate these contents to the rank of necess-
ary truth. For the facts of science have the
aspect of a vast conglomerate, one thing coming
side by side with another, as if they were merely
given and presented, - as in short devoid of all
essential or necessary connexion. In consequence
of this stimulus thought is dragged out of its
unrealized universality and its fancied or merely
possible satisfaction, and impelled onwards to a
77. Seth, HP, 118.
78. Hegel, Bacyclopadie, 19.
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development from itself. On one band this devel-
opment only means that thought incorp orates the
contents of science, in all their specialty of
detail as submitted. On the other it makes these
contents imitate the action of the original creat-
ive thought, and present the aspect of a free
evolution determined by the logic of the fact
alone.
Thus Hegel has Indicated that logic cannot be content with the
abstract forms of subjective knowing alone, but that thought, by its very
nature, is forced to see concrete experience as constituted by the very
form which the logic discloses. Thus his pregnant statement which
follows: "If thought never gets further than the universality of the
Ideas, as was perforce the case in the first philosophies (when the ELea-
tics never got beyond Being, or Heraclitus beyond Becoming) , it is justly
80
open to the charge of formalism". Starting from experience, the fact
that human finitude is itself a necessary part of the Absolute Truth is
derived. "This proposition is identical with the assertion that the
81
dialectical method is the true method of philosophy. For Hegel,
reality is the objectification of reason. The world is to be understood
as the product of an unfolding principle wholly rational in nature, and
truth can be defined only by taking into account a certain necessary
totality of the diversities of experience. The unified totality of
phenomena is itself the truth. There is no truth beyond phenomena, yet
no single phenomenon constitutes the whole truth.
79. Hegel, Bncyclopfldie, 19-20.
80. Ibid., 21.
81. Royce, IM, 154-155.
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The logic of Hegel, therefore, is not restricted to the mere
thought-forms of the mind, but is expressive of the very structure of
reality itself. The definition of Hegelian logic given by Harris ex-
presses the true content of it when he says:
Logic is the science of the principles,
method, and system of what is universal and
necessary in thought, and it unfolds or de-
fines and criticizes all the elements of
thought, from the simplest, shallowest and
most rudimental up to the richest, most com-
prehensive and luminous idea to which phil-
osophy has attained. 8*
Hegel's logic, as containing the principles of the only possible
metaphysics, is described in grand terms by Royce, when he sums up the
matter in these words:
Bach of these negative discoveries /Tn ex-
perience/, however tragic from the point of view
of the life, that is, of the idea or opinion or
attitude concerned, is in fact also a positive
discovery, a new revelation as to the inter-
relation of the mind and of things, a new proof
that in the realm of experience subject and ob-
ject are not to be sundered, and that their unity
develops out of the very conflicts which appear
to exist between them so long as their relations
are imperfectly appreciated. 83
In conclusion, it should be noted that there have been many
criticisms of Hegel's deduction of the categories, most of which have
been criticisms of the detail, and of the deduction of certain specific
84
categories. These criticisms are beyond the scope of this work, but
82. Harris, HL, 19*
83. Royce, LMI, 215*
84. In this connection, see Stace, POH, 172; McTaggart, CHL,
passim; and especially, McTaggart, SHD, 75-120.

in defence of Hegel no better word can be spoken than that which he him-
self speaks in the introduction to his Science of Logic, when he says:
1 could not of course imagine that the
Method which in this system of Logic I have
followed - or rather which this System follows
of itself - is not capable of much improvement,
of much elaboration in detail, but at the same
time I know that it is the only true Method.
This is already evident from the fact that the
Method is in no ways different from its object
and content; - for it is the content in itself,
the Dialectic which it has in itself , that
moves it on.0 '3
85. Hegel, SOL, 65.

CHAPTER FIVE
HEGELIAN AND SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC COMPARED
Our study has shown that Hegel's logic goes far beyond the
traditional logic both in scope of treatment and in final result. Its
emphasis lies not upon determining a few fundamental principles of
thought, but rather upon determining the ultimate nature of all thought
as basic to the very structure of the universe itself, Hegel objected to
traditional logic on the ground of its inadequacy to express the whole
truth. 1 For Hegel, traditional logic was all right as far as it went,
but it didnH go far enough.
Hegel shows his appreciation of formal logic in a passage in the
Bncyclop&die :
Nor is it unimportant to study thought even
as a subjective energy. A detailed analysis of
its nature would exhibit rules and laws, a know-
ledge of which is derived from experience. A
treatment of the laws of thought, from this point
of view, used once to form the body of logical
science. Of that science Aristotle was the
founder. He succeeded in assigning to thought
what properly belongs to it. Our thought is
extremely concrete; but in its composite con-
tents we must distinguish the part that properly
belongs to thought, or the abstract mode of its
action. A subtle spiritual bond, consisting in
the agency of thought, is what gives unity to
all these contents, and it was this bond, the
form as form, that Aristotle noted and described.
...The purport of the science is to become
1. Cf. 77.
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acquainted with the procedure Of finite thought:
and, if it is adapted to its presupposed object,
the science is entitled to be styled correct, 2
In his History of Philosophy , Hegel admits the tremendous con-
tribution Aristotle has made in his formal logic, and says that "Aristotle
has rendered a never-ending service in having recognized and determined
the forms which thought assumes within us". But he goes on to criticize
that logic for being formal and abstract, and for that reason inadequate
as an expression of the whole truth. Because of this inadequacy, it
needs to be reinforced by a new logic which will overcome this deficiency
of the older logic.
In evaluating this criticism, two questions must be kept in
mind J First, what does Hegel mean by "truth"? Second, what does Hegel
mean by "formal" and "abstract"?
In answer to the first question, our study has shown that truth
for Hegel does not involve mere consistency , but also coherence . Truth
is not a question of correctnessf but a question of the whole. No state-
ment for Hegel is true unless it involves all its possible relationships
to the whole of reality. The Hegelian emphasis is upon including in our
view in the most coherent way the whole range of our judgments about ex-
perience. When, therefore, Hegel speaks of an object as being "untrue",
he means by the term that it is considered as apart from all of its
relationships to the rest of reality. This view of the true as being
2. Hegel, Bacyclopadie , 39-40.
3. Ibid., HP, II, 219.
4. Cf, Hegel, Bncyclopadle , 305.
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the whole is basic to Hegel's entire system, and to an understanding of
it. Truth for Hegel means adequacy, and his objection to syllogistic
logic as being inadequate is in reference to its ability to reveal or
even to test the whole truth.
Keeping in mind, then, Hegel* s essential meaning of truth, we
can understand more clearly the apparent contradiction between what he
says of traditional logic above? and what he says of it in the intro-
duction to his Science of Logic: "it may be said that, both in Form and
Content, as exhibited in the textbooks, Logic has become contemptible", 6
At this point it is well to call attention to an impression that
has been growing as a result of this study: the impression that the logic
of Aristotle, and modern syllogistic and symbolic logic are identified to
such an extent that the criticisms that may properly apply to the latter
apply also to the former. It is to be emphasized that we have primarily
in mind the comparison of Aristotle's formal logic with that of Hegel, not
a comparison of Hegel's logic with some modern extension of formal logic.
We need to recognize that Hegel is frequently harsh beyond justification
with Aristotle's logic, and that all of the criticisms he applies to it
are not to be taken literally as they are made. It must be remembered
that Hegel is emphasizing a particular conception of the purpose of logic,
and that this emphasis influences his view of the opposing logic.
In our study of Aristotle's logic 7 we noted that truth for
5. Cf. 122-123.
6. Hegel, SOL, 62,
7. Cf, Chapter 2.
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Aristotle means consistency. No statement which is inconsistent with it-
self and with reality can be true. What is necessary for us to do is to
clear up a misunderstanding which has arisen between the two conceptions
of truth, Hegel's and Aristotle's. Hegel would agree that statements
must be consistent to be true; on the other hand, Hegel, it seems, over-
emphasizes the fact that statements must also refer to reality* It is
not to be thought that this over-emphasis is absolutely unjustified, but
it does seem to produce the unwarranted conclusion that the formal logic
over against which he places his own logic does not have a like reference
to reality. It may be that the text-books of Hegel's day treated logic
as a purely formal science, and divorced that science from any necessary
connection with real things. It is obvious that such a thing can be done
easily enough. But if so, it is not to be supposed that logic, as Aris-
totle formulated it, had no reference to reality. Study shows that Aris-
totle^ logic was no less metaphysical than Hegel's. Aristotle's logic
was meant to deal with the realities or reality of the world, and was not
ultimately "pure" or formal".
Aristotle would never hold that his logic did not apply to
reality. Aristotle was empirical in his method, and he based his con-
clusions upon observations from experience. When he established his
logic, he had in mind not only the relations between ideas, but also the
relations between things as they existed in the external world. In his
Metaphysics , for example, Aristotle defines truth as obtaining when the
mental conjunction of terms agrees with reality, and says, "he speaks
falsely who, when either things are or when they are not, makes assertions

about them in a contrary way to that in which they actually subsist".
Aristotle's conception of logic, therefore, agrees closely with Hegel*s
conception of logic, and the main difference in their respective con-
ceptions of truth lies not in the relationship of logic to reality, but in
the Aristotelian emphasis upon consistency with other propositions and
correspondence with perceived reality as a criterion for logical truth,
and the Hegelian emphasis upon coherence as well. At this point Hegel
does not disparage the Aristotelian principle of consistency, but supple-
ments it by an appeal to coherence. When, therefore, Hegel speaks of
syllogistic logic as untrue, it must always be remembered that he is
speaking of it in terms of its inadequacy as an expression of the whole
of reality. But it must not be assumed that Aristotle's formal logic has
no reference to reality, for, if it had no such reference, it would be
worthless as an instrument by which to determine the validity of our
ideas about reality.
Now Hegel's essential meaning of truth brings to light what he
means by the term "abstract" • Abstract for Hegel does not mean, as we
have seen above, that a given object is viewed as apart from the rela-
tionships with which it belongs. Since the true is the whole, an object
is untrue only in the sense that it is separated from the whole which
makes it true. When Hegel speaks of logic as "formal", however, it
seems as if he does believe it to be apart from reality, and to deal with
mere external forms of thought which are applied in a purely external way
Q
to reality. In this sense, the criticism is justified, if we keep in
8. Aristotle, MET, VIII, x, S49.
9. Cf. Hegel, SOL, 62.
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mind Hegel's essential aim, Hegel is willing to credit formal logic with
a certain kind of validity. In so far as formal logic restricts itself t<
the forms of thought about particulars as such, it fulfills its aim. As
the science of the forms of finite thought, formal logic is adequate. Bu1
Hegel's aim in his logic is to go beyond the mere forms of finite or sub-
jective thought, which in his opinion are untrue because inadequate, to
absolute thought, in which thought is true because it contains thought in
all its relations to the whole of reality.
Abstract and concrete were terms which were not in the philo-
sophical vocabulary of Aristotle's day. 10 But Aristotle does make a
distinction between ideas which are abstract, and concrete realities. If
we are to describe the relation between abstract and concrete in Aristotl€
we must say that for him the abstract is in the concrete; the concrete
contains or embodies the abstract. 11 As far as Aristotle was concerned,
then, any abstract term has meaning only as it can be applied to a con-
crete individual.
The result of all this is the recognition of the fact that the
distinction between Aristotelian logic and the logic of Hegel is not
rooted in a metaphysical reference so much as it is rooted in a differ-
ence of metaphysics and approach. Hegel conceives reality as Thought
and approaches it from the point of view of thought; Aristotle, on the
other hand, approaches thought from the point of view of reality, In
10. Cf. Grote, ARI, 64-65.
11. Cf. Aristotle, Categorlae, I.
)
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both, the logic produced has a definite relation to real existence.
When, therefore, Hegel speaks of syllogistic logic as "abstract",
"untrue", "inadequate", etc., he refers only to the fact that it deals
with elements of thought apart from their relationships to the whole of
reality* In no sense does he mean that traditional logic has no reference
to reality.
We have seen, then, that Hegel criticizes syllogistic logic on
the ground that it is inadequate as an expression of the whole truth, and
therefore needs to be reinforced by a new logic which will overcome this
deficiency of the older logic. But if traditional logic is inadequate to
express the whole truth, the question arises: What position, if any, does
traditional logic occupy in Hegel* s logical system, and is it of any real
value? Our answer to this question may be approached by noting the place
Hegel gives to the so-called "Laws of Thought" - Identity, Contradiction,
and Excluded Middle - and the Syllogism. These elements may be taken as
fundamental to syllogistic logic, the former being the presuppositions
upon which the latter, syllogism, is based.
In Hegel's view, formal logic begins with presuppositions which
cannot be held to be adequate to the production of truth* Here, again,
it is necessary to remember that truth for Hegel means the whole* Logic
cannot take for granted any of the forms of reflection or rules and laws
of thought for these are a part of the very fabric of logic and must be
demonstrated within the boundaries of the science itself* In other words,
"What Logic is cannot be set out beforehand - on the contrary this know-
ledge of what Logic is can only be reached as the end and consummation of
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12the whole treatment of the subject". Hegel objects to presuppositions
on the ground that formal logic, and all philosophy for that matter, still
leaves unanswered the question as to why such presuppositions are true.
They remain unexplained facts, and philosophy can never hope to explain
13
anything if it starts from a mystery, Hegel's aim in his logic is to
show that the dialectical method is not subject to this objection. But
does he? We have seen that Aristotle's presuppositions were drawn from
the facts of experience; they were not arbitrary constructs. The pro-
cess of distinction exemplified by the principle of identity is a fact of
experience. But Hegel begins with a presupposition also, and he finds
also that this presupposition is corroborated by the facts of experience.
It would seem, therefore, that in this criticism of formal logic there is
both a great truth, and also an error. The truth is Hegel's emphasis
upon the movement of dialectic and the fact that merely to state the
principle of identity does not get at the whole truth. On the other hand,
Hegel appears to be somewhat illogical when he holds that the principles
underlying formal logic involve unproved presuppositions, for Hegel him-
self also starts from a presupposition. The conclusion, then, must be
that Hegel is being so dogmatic in his assertion of what he sees to be
the truth that he appears to be too harsh with the logic he feels to be
inadequate to the expression of that truth. This tendency to appear
harsh in his judgment of syllogistic logic must be tempered by keeping in
mind such passages as the following, in which Hegel says:
12, Hegel, SOL, 53,
13, Ibid,, aacyclopftdie, 369.
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1 Aristotle has rendered a never-ending
service in having recognized and determined
the forms which thought assumes within us*
For what interests us is the concrete thought
immersed as it is in externalities; these
forms constitute a net of eternal activity
sunk within it, and the operation of setting
in their places those fine threads which are
drawn throughout everything is a masterpiece
of empiricism, and this knowledge is absolutely-
valuable. •••The best of what is stated re-
specting the forms of judgment, conclusion,
etc., in ordinary logic, is taken from the
works of Aristotle: as far as details are
concerned, much has been added to it, but
the truth is to be found with Aristotle. 14
Hegel's phrase, "net of eternal activity" is significant here.
The wholism of Hegel's metaphysics is set over against the pluralism of
Aristotle's metaphysics.
In the second place, formal logic, with its presupposition of
the validity of the canon of identity or contradiction, is a work of the
15
understanding, and reason as reflection is nullified thereby. Logic,
Hegel says, taken as the science of thinking in general, is understood
as the bare form of cognition. It is considered as abstracted from all
content, and considers that this content, which lies outside of the dis-
cipline, must be brought in and added to its conceptions to give it
content. Note that Hegel says this is one conception of formal logic -
he does not specifically state that this represents Aristotle's view of
formal logic. But over against this conception of formal logic, Hegel
places his own, in which he considers formal logic to be deficient in
14. Hegel, HP, II, 219-220. Cf. above, 128.
15. Cf. Hegel, Bncyclopfidie, 368-369.
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1that it is all content and very little form
Here.. .we come across the drawback per-
taining to the whole Aristotelian manner, as
also to all succeeding logic... that in thought
and in the movement of thought as such, the
individual moments fall asunder; there are a
number of kinds of judgment and conclusion,
each of which is held to be independent, and
is supposed to have absolute truth as such.
Thus they are simply content, for they then
have an indifferent, undistinguished exist-
ence, such as we see in the famous laws of
contradiction... ,etc# In this isolation they
have, however, no truth; for their totality
alone is the truth of thought because this
totality is at once subjective and objective.
Thus they are only the material of truth, the
formless content: their deficiency is hence
not that they are only forms but rather that
form is lacking to them, and they are in too
great a degree content.
^
6
But in the conception of logic as the bare form of cognition,
reason is renouncing itself, and thus the concept of truth is lost. rtIt
is restricted to the cognition of merely subjective truth, of mere
17
appearance, - knowing falls back into opinion". This falling of
knowing back into opinion
,
Hegel continues, contains the germ of the dia
lectic by which logic operates as true thought - the perception of the
necessary conflict with each other of the determinations of the under-
standing* The immediate concrete must be transcended and must undergo
determination and abstraction. But reflection must just as much trans-
cend these its own separative determinations and forthwith relate them
18
to each other. In other words, Hegel stresses the fact that in ordin
16. Hegel, HP, II, 222-223. Note that here again Hegel is attacking
the pluralism of Aristotle*
17. Ibid., SOL, 56*
18. Ibid., 56.
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ary logic, the Aristotelian forms are only thought-determinations between
which the understanding makes distinctions, "This, however", he says,
"is not speculative thought; i.e
. , of reason as distinguished from under-
standing: for there the identity of the understanding which allows
19
nothing to contradict itself is fundamental".
Aristotelian logic is based upon the law of identity or contra-
diction, depending upon whether the principle is stated affirmatively or
negatively. Both of these are expressions of the fundamental law of con-
20
sistency , whose logical significance lies in the fact that if there is
to be any definition or affirmation possible, the character of notions or
concepts must remain fixed. This, in Aristotle*s view, is the highest
law of thought. Unless a distinction can be maintained, thought becomes
impossible. If A and non-A are the same, we cannot retain meaning even
in the simplest statements*
Aristotle, therefore, started with the presupposition that every
object is an identity. For example, if I speak of "this book", I am
referring to "this book" in isolation from everything else that can be
conceived. The operation of formal logic consists in putting an isolated
idea like that of "this book" into relation with an idea of another ob-
ject and drawing a conclusion from them based upon their inclusion in, or
exclusion from, a class to which both belong. Its correct operation
depends upon the fact that these objects can be set apart as identities
in themselves. The traditional laws of thought are concerned, therefore,
132
19. Hegel, SOL, 222.
20. Cf. above, 45-46,
*
•133
1
with external relations, and are accordingly dealt with by Hegel in the
sphere of Bssence, which is the sphere of external relations; the sphere
in which objects of thought are considered as self-identical, unrelated
to each other except externally, and without opposites. When the prin-
ciples of Bssence, or external relations, are taken as essential prin-
ciples of thought they find their expression in the universal laws of
thought.
Mich has been made of Hegel's "denial" of the laws of thought,
Hegel nowhere categorically denies their validity; what he does do is to
show that they are merely one-sided abstractions. The Law of Identity,
for example, states: "Everything is identical with itself; A is A". Its
converse states the opposite: "A cannot at the same time and in the same
respect be both A and non-A", The Law of Excluded Middle emphasizes the
fact that there can be no middle ground between the contradictories A and
non-A, The Law of Identity is an abstraction that excludes all differ-
ence. The Law of Contradiction is an abstraction that excludes all
identity. What Hegel points out is, forst, that each of these has no
meaning without the other. The proposition, A is A, for example, is not
properly a proposition at all. A proposition has as its aim the dis-
tinction between a subject and a predicate; the Law of Identity makes
no such distinction. Thus Hegel says, (speaking of the Law of Identity):
This maxim, instead of being a true law
of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract
understanding. The prepositional form contra-
dicts it: for a proposition always promises a
distinction between subject and predicate, while
the present one does not fulfill what its form
requires.
21. Hegel, Encyclopfldie, 213-214.
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Again, the three laws of thought, taken as absolute, serve to
nullify one another.
The various propositions which are set up
as absolute laws of Thought are, more closely
considered, opposed to one another, they contra-
dict and cancel one another. - If everything is
self-identical it is not distinguished; it con-
tains no opposition and has no ground* Or when
it is assumed that there are no two identical
things, that is, each thing is different from
every other, then A is not equal to A, A is
therefore not opposite, and so on. If either
of these propositions is assumed, the assumption
of the other is barred. - A thoughtless consid-
eration of these propositions enumerates them
one after the other, so that they appear quite
unrelated; it thinks only of their intro-
reflectedness , without paying attention to
their other moment, Positedness or their de-
terminateness as such, which drags them for-
ward to transition and their negation. 2
In Hegel* s view, then, the laws of thought are canons of the pro-
cedure of the understanding. All are on the stage of the development of
mind at which it regards opposites as mutually exclusive and absolutely
cut off from each other. Hegel's "denial" of these laws consists in the
principle that each category contains, and is, its own opposite. But
this is not a denial of the Law of Contradiction or of the Law of Ident-
ity because it is this law which compels thought to advance beyond the
statements existing between thesis and antithesis to the synthesis. It
is because reason cannot rest in external contradictions that thesis and
antithesis must be resolved in the synthesis.
Hegel has no objection to these laws of thought if it is real-
ized that they constitute one aspect or element of thought, and not its
22. Hegel, SOL, II, 37.

whole nature. Thought is always distinction, but it is also relation *
It both marks off and at the same time connects. Distinction depends up-
on relation, and an absolute distinction would destroy it. The Law of
Identity or Contradiction must be qualified by the law which asserts the
relativity of the thoughts distinguished. For understanding, the cate-
gories remain fixed, separated, static, and lifeless, each cut off com-
pletely from the others. For understanding, no deduction (in the Hegelian
sense) is possible. "Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world
of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract » Either- or* as
23
the understanding maintains" • Reason breaks up this schematism of the
understanding and shows that the truth does not lie wholly in A, nor
OA
wholly in non-A, but in the synthesis of the two.^
Hegel*s objection to understanding is not against the distinct-
ions, nor that understanding has not its proper place. Again we come to
the fundamental principle at the basis of his whole system: the true is
the whole. The error of understanding is to imagine that the truth is the
whole truth, that distinctions and oppositions are real, while identity
in opposition is unreal. All Hegel means when he "denies" the Aristote--
25llan laws of thought is their absolute validity. If the world as in-
telligible is a world Of distinction and individuality, it is also, as
intelligible, a world of unity; for all difference presupposes a unity
by which it can be measured. Thus, there are no absolute separations or
23. Hegel, Sncyclopadie , 223.
24. Cf. Ibid., 356.
25. Cf. McTaggart
,
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oppositions that cannot be reconciled, Bvery definite assertion has a
relation to its negative (A< >non-A) from which it cannot be separated
without losing its meaning. In the very definiteness with which it is
asserted is a proof that its affirmation is not absolute. Hegel, there-
fore, does not oppose, but includes the Aristotelian principles in his
thought, and draws from them the meaning implied by them.*'6 He must
utilize these principles to differentiate his thesis and antithesis, but
he goes beyond them to include them in a larger whole, the synthesis. He
therefore begins with Aristotle, and makes explicit what Aristotle did
not, but what was implicit in Aristotle's logic all the while. For,
Hegel says, the content of Aristotle's logic "is none other than the
27
speculative Idea".
When we come to the syllogism, we find that Hegel puts it on the
highest stage of the dialectic, Begriff , as the subjective notion. It is
essentially the process of reason mediating between thesis and antithesis
and moving on to a synthesis.
The nature of syllogistic reasoning consists in this: A single
proposition simply makes an assertion without stating the grounds on
which it rests. A syllogism, however, justifies its conclusion by showing
the premises from which it has been derived. It thus appeals to reason
and compels assent. The premises in turn must rest in propositions whose
truth everyone will accept, and syllogistic reasoning thus consists in
showing how the truth of some proposition follows necessarily from other
propositions whose truth is admitted.
26. Cf. Hegel, flncyclopfldie , 143.
27. Hegel, HP, II, 222.
136
ft
5
41
( t
C
The method by which this is accomplished is the process of
mediation ; a process by which a middle term common to two propositions
acts as a bridge, or a connecting link, and makes possible a conclusion
resulting from the connection of the two propositions through the middle
term. It is important to remember that this process is not a mere linking
of the words or terms of propositions, but the middle term represents the
universal principle by which reasoning always reaches a conclusion from
28
two prior propositions. The logical argument is a process of comparison
and the law of identity is fundamentally important here, for is the
meaning of the terms does not remain fixed, no comparison is possible.
The middle term is the important element of the syllogism, for it con-
stitutes the mediating link between the major and minor terms and makes
possible their union.
Upon the position of the middle term in the premises depends the
Figure of the syllogism. Aristotle defines a syllogism as follows:
When three terms are so related to one
another that the last is included in the middle
as in a whole and the middle is included or is
not included in the first as in a whole, there
is necessarily a perfect syllogism in connect-
ing the extremes.
This statement indicates that Aristotle's treatment is largely a
quantitative one at the logical level. That is, each of the terms, in-
cluding the middle term, represents a whole as well as just a class as
such. The principle as formulated here is for Aristotle the principle
upon which all syllogistic reasoning is based. There are four possible
28. Creighton, IL, 137.
29. Aristotle, Analytlca Priora
,
25b, 32-35.
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arrangements of the middle term, three of which were recognized by-
Aristotle:
First Figure Second Figure Third Figure
M - P P-M M-P
S - M S - M M-S
S-P S-P S-P
The first figure Aristotle refers to as a "perfect syllogism",
illustrated by the definition given above. Aristotle himself says, "I
call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been
30
stated to make plain what necessarily follows". The other two figures
have no validity independent of the first. They are "imperfect" hecause
the conclusions drawn from them do not follow directly from the premises,
but from propositions which do follow immediately from them and which
conform to the conditions of the first figure; i.e., to the dictum de
31
omni et nullo. For this reason, reduction to the first figure was, for
many centuries, considered an integral part of the doctrine of the syllo-
32
gism. But with the rules of the syllogism it is now possible to de-
cide the validity of arguments in any figure independently.
All of this indicates the character of the Aristotelian doctrine
33
of the syllogism. As may be expected by this time, Hegel objects to the
traditional doctrine of the syllogism, Aristotelian logic is wholly
empirical, says Hegel. It lists such and such kinds of judgments, syllo-
30, Aristotle, Analytica Priora, 24b, 20-25.
31, Cf, above, 44.
32. Cf, Frye & Levi, RB, 277.
33. Cf. Hegel, Bncyclopadie, 314-329, where he treats each figure of
the syllogism in its relationship to the others as logically deduced from
a preceding figure.
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gisms, etc., but no reason is ever given for their arrangement except
that things are related that way to each other in experience as it is
formulated. They are derived from experience, it is true, and they
represent the true nature of subjective thought, but they are not ration-
ally connected into a system. They remain on the level of external re-
lations, where thought is essentially static and lifeless. Thus, Hegel
says:
In this we get an empirical logic - surely
an odd science, an irrational cognition of the
rational. Logic thus affords a very bad ex-
ample of obedience to its own lessons. 34
Hegel accepts the syllogistic reasoning of Aristotle and then
proceeds to deal with it according to the dialectical method. Its prin-
ciples are not merely asserted, but logically deduced in the same manner
as the rest of his logic, and logic is thus raised from a "heap of
empirical facts to the level of a rational science, which, as the science
Sfi
of reason, it, above all others, surely ought to be". For Hegel,
notions, judgments, and syllogisms are not merely subjective forms of
thought, and no more. They are parts of a universal whole, and can be
understood as true only in reference to their relationship to the whole.
Here again, emphasis is placed upon Hegel's basic proposition: the true
is the whole. As the thesis of the highest stage of the dialectic, Be-
36
griff, Hegel demonstrates that the syllogism comes under his notion of
34. Hegel, DFL (Macran), 163.
35. Stace, POH, 226-227.
36. Note that there are less comprehensive categories in Hegel's
logic, but that each is an expression of the truth only because of its
relationship to the Absolute.
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the self-unfolding of the Absolute (Middle TermJ ) , and cannot remain as
a purely subjective form of reasoning. The mind is forced to realize
that the syllogism is expressive of objective nature as well.^7 For
Hegel, the syllogism is not only the supreme form of human reasoning, but
all of reality finds its expression in the form of syllogism.
The foregoing examination of the logic of Aristotle and of
Hegel indicates that the two logics are not as far apart in meaning as
might at first be supposed. A summation of the principle antitheses
between the two logics will emphasize this fact.
(1) The function of syllogistic reasoning is to draw conclusions
from propositions by means of a middle term in which they participate or
are included. Syllogistic logic is a logic of class-inclusion based on
similarity, including difference. Hegel recognizes this function of the
syllogism, and adapts it to his conception of thought as a dialectical
movement. Hegel* s is a logic of inclusion based on similarity-difference
included in a higher unity. The syllogism is shown to be a necessary
stage in the evolution of the absolute truth, and it represents the basic
function of the mind. For both Aristotelian and Hegelian logic, the
principle of mediation is basic. The difference between them comes in
the method by which each accomplishes the mediation. In Aristotelian
logic, mediation is accomplished by a term which is common to, and there-
fore mediates between, two other terms; a term which is, common with the
37. Hegel, gacyclopadie , 338-329.
38. Ibid., 50.
-
141
others, a class whole (collective). Mediation consists in passing to a
conclusion from two propositions whose common term is related to both of
them by the principle of class-inclusion and class-exclusion. In the
logic of Hegel, mediation is accomplished as an internal necessity of
thought itself to include everything in an organic whole which includes
classes as well. This is manifested in the tendency of the mind to seek
to harmonize contradictions in a higher concept or synthesis, in which the
contradictions are canceled, yet at the same time preserved.
(2) Syllogistic logic is atomistic and analytic. As such, it is
involved with external relations, and mediation involves terms which are
externally related. Hegel's logic, on the other hand, is organic and
synoptic, and mediation involves internal relations. Syllogistic logic
revolves around the principle of identity; Hegelian logic revolves
around the idea of complement (dialectic). In syllogistic logic, exter-
nal objects are not necessarily identical; in Hegelian logic the con-
tradiction is internal, and the contradictories are not opposed except in
thought. Hegel has a place for syllogistic logic, but he recognizes that
it must be transcended.
(3) Syllogistic logic is abstract; but so also is Hegelian
logic. The antithesis between the two logics in the matter of their re-
lation to reality is only apparent. While Hegel consistently emphasizes
that his logic expresses the underlying principles of reality, the logic
of Aristotle seems to be set apart from reality; yet his metaphysics is
constantly its underlying presupposition. The distinction between
syllogistic logic, as Aristotle founded it and formulated it, and the

logic of Hegel is not so much a metaphysical difference as a difference
in approach, Hegel appraoches reality from the point of view of thought
Aristotle approaches thought from the point of view of reality. In both,
the logic produced has a definite relationship to real existence,
(4) Aristotelian logic and Hegelian logic differ in their
criterion of truth, For formal logic, consistency is the criterion; for
Hegelian logic the emphasis is upon coherence , which includes and at the
same time transcends Aristotelian consistency. The logic of Aristotle is
sterile; a concept one defined is static. In hegelian logic, a concept,
once defined, needs to be criticized. The logic of Aristotle, therefore,
is static; analysis by class-inelusion by itself tells you only what you
have. Hegelian logic, on the other hand, is an evolution or development;
it is a movement of thought, and is therefore dynamic. The syllogistic
logic of identity fixes the mind upon static relationships; the dynamic
logic of contradiction and synthesis makes possible further advance in a
knowledge of relations, and the production of new truth.
(5) The chief distinction between Hegelian and Aristotelian
logic is in the Hegelian emphasis upon the whole as having properties
which its parts do not have. The emphasis is Aristotelian logic is upon
classes, and the distinction between Hegelian wholes and Aristotelian
class-wholes should be kept in mind. A whole for Aristotle is a class;
when he speaks of "dog", for example, he refers to dog as a class term
which includes as its properties all that is characteristic of dogs as a
class. The conception of "dog" as a class is a fixed conception; there
is no reference to the properties which an individual dog may possess
t
that are not common to the class as a whole.
Hegel, on the other hand, would speak of "dog" with reference to
the individual dog not only with reference to characteristics which it has
in common with all other dogs, but also with reference to his relationship
to all the rest of reality. The concept here is a dynamic one, and in-
cludes not only those characteristics common to "dog 1* as a class, but also
all those relationships characteristic of this particular dog as distinct
from all others. The emphasis in Aristotelian logic, therefore, is upon
wholes as classes; the emphasis in Hegelian logic is upon wholes as
organic wholes possessing properties which their parts do not have. The
Aristotelian whole is a class-concept; the Hegelian whole is an organic
concept. Aristotelian logic proceeds by the method of analysis to seek
those characteristics by which a given object may be included in a class.
Hegelian logic emphasizes the fact that analysis can never reveal the
whole truth about anything; nothing less than a knowledge of all the
relationships of an object to the rest of reality is adequate as an ex-
pression of the whole truth. Bvery synthesis is a synopsis - it has
properties the thesis and antithesis do not have.
It should be noted here that the concept of the Hegelian whole
creeps into nformalw logic in, for example, the idea of collective terms,
and in connection with the fallacy of composition and division. Here
Aristotle recognizes the properties which wholes have which their parts
do not have.
If we were to be asked, then, as a result of our study of
Hegelian and syllogistic logic: What is the ultimate significance of
(( •
t
*
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> Hegelian logic? the answer would be: Hegelian logic has emphasized the
one thing that is integral to logic, and yet was not seen clearly until
the time of Hegel - the properties of wholes which their parts do not
have. The true is the whole, and anything less than a statement as
adequate and as coherent as possible about any given object falls short
of giving us the whole truth about that object.
4 Oi lH"A 0«
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the following summary indicates the main points
brought out by this study in comparative logic.
(1) Logic received its first systematic exposition and formula-
tion by Aristotle, although preparatory work had been done in this direc-
tion by earlier thinkers, most notably Socrates and Plato. Aristotle,
basing his work upon contributions made by all previous thinkers, was the
first philosopher to segregate the problem of thought as such from the
other philosophic disciplines and to systematize the science of logic.
The science has remained practically as ^iristotle formulated it with the
exception of a few minor corrections and additions. The development of
modern logic has taken, in general, two forms: (1) modern symbolic or
mathematical logic, which is a logic of high abstraction and generaliza-
tion, and is a process of relating terms in equations irrespective of the
subject matter involved; and (2) scientific or inductive logic, which is
a logic based upon observation in experience and leading to the formula-
tion of valid generalizations which make possible reliable scientific
prediction. Based upon the methods of John Stuart Mill, and allied with
the use of hypothesis and experimentation, inductive logic produces laws
of high probability and leads to the modern ideal of science in which the
concept of progress has taken the place of an ideal of a demonstrative
science based upon immutable principles. By the use of inductive pro-
cedures science arrives at generalizations, and its aim is to extend

these generalizations to other areas of the phenomenal world. This is
accomplished by the uniting of inductive and deductive methods of logical
inquiry. The logic of Hegel, in spite of the fact that it aims at an
exposition of the movement of subjective thought as well as of objective
thought, is usually treated in logical history as a metaphysics rather
than a logic. The result of the historical survey of logic is to indicate
that Aristotle's deductive logic remains essentially the same as it was
when Aristotle had finished a systematization of its principles, and that
Hegel* s logic is the only logic in direct antithesis to it.
(2) Aristotle made no definite attempt to locate his logic with-
in his classification of the sciences. His logical treatises are set
apart from his other works, and logic is treated as a propaedeutic which
is properly a part of the general culture of everyone before he undertakes
to study any science. The problem of formal logic is to determine the
nature of the unchangeable principles governing all reasoning. The
science gives us the answer to this problem, and nothing more. As a
result of his analysis, Aristotle reaches the conclusion that the syllo-
gism is fundamental to all reasoning. Fundamental to the syllogism is
the principle of dictum de omni et nullo and the fundamental Laws of
Thought. The basis of the whole system is the principle of class-
inclusion. Validity in reasoning is obtained only when a given term can
be shown to be included in or excluded from a more comprehensive class of
which it is a member. Syllogistic logic is a logic of classes; a logic
of consistency between propositions.
Syllogistic logic is subject to certain limitations. It has an
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s abstract and formal character. As a logic of consistency, anything can be
true which is not self-contradictory. The problem of syllogistic logic
is to show what combinations of concepts or judgments can be employed as
premises which lead to valid conclusions in the syllogism* It deals with
validating forms of inference, therefore, and shows these forms in ab-
straction from the particular subject matter to which they apply. Syllo-
gistic logic, therefore, often results in an artificial separation of
formal and material truth. It comes to its end in the statement of the
principles of valid reasoning.
Secondly, the syllogism is not an instrument for the discovery
of new truth; it brings to light only what is specifically implied in
truths which are already known. It is restricted or limited to those
premises already available to us. Modern philosophers have criticized
formal logic for this defect, but it should not be expected to produce
that for which it is not fitted and which it never claims to produce.
Syllogistic logic is important, not as a method of discovery, but as a
means of testing the correctness of the instruments of reasoning.
In the third place, syllogistic logic is limited in its basic
principle that every proposition can be included in, or excluded from,
a given class. Syllogistic logic deals only with propositions common to
large classes of objects. It is limited, therefore, because no inferences
can be drawn about the relations of two propositions to each other unless
the proposition with which each of them is compared is in both cases the
same. Logic errs in considering relations between propositions to be
ultimately reducible to relationships between their terms. It deals
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wholly with propositions analyzed into subject-predicate relationships,
and does not deal with any proposition standing by itself, as an un-
analyzed whole, in its relations to any other proposition as a whole.
Syllogistic logic, then, is a limited instrument. It is an in-
strument for determining the consistency of our ideas and as such is the
minimum ground for truth. But it treats knowledge from an atomistic,
»
analytic point of view. It deals solely with the formal operation of the
thought processes from the point of view of its parts without taking into
consideration wholes which have properties which their parts do not have,
(3) The significance of Hegel in the history of philosophy is
that he unites in one system the Aristotelian and Kantian movements in
thought. He unites in one system the conclusion arrived at by both the
objective movement in Greek philosophy and the subjective movement of
modern philosophy - personal consciousness as the highest principle of
life. The objective movement, culminating in Plato and Aristotle,
arrived at a conception of reality as mind or reason immenant in the
world of nature. Modern subjective philosophy arrived at the conclusion
(in Kant) that to investigate the pure thought-notions of the mind is to
investigate the laws of existence as it is known or knowable in experience
The philosophy of Hegel recognizes the implications of Kant's
critical philosophy as over against the results of Greek ontology, and
his philosophy is an attempt to arrive at a synthesis of the essential
tendencies and ideals of both Greek and modern thought. His philosophy
is the last phase of the one "universal philosophy", and as such is the
synthesis of all that is true in previous thought. The contributions of

all previous thinkers have been included in and given new significance in
a whole that purports to explain adequately the whole of reality. Grow-
ing out of the immediate work of Fichte and Schelling, Hegel completely
rejects the concept of the "ding-an-sichw , the concept of an Absolute or
totality which remains hidden forever, abd begins with the assumption that
the forms of cognition are identical with the principles of being. For
Hegel, reason and nature cannot be distinguished from one another. In
this lies his objection to previous logic, both formal and transcendental,
for he conceives that logic should be identified with metaphysics. The
chief distinction, then, between the logic of Hegel and syllogistic logic
is that Hegel* s logic holds the central place of unfolding the method and
principles of all thought, both subjective and objective.
The logic of Kegel is the abstract and systematic exposition of
the final truth of reality which is discovered in the examination of ex-
perience in the Phenomenology . Both works are corelative: the Phen omen-
ology contains the whole of Hegel* a system from the point of view of the
concrete forms of actual experience; the Logic includes the whole from
the point of view of its ultimate form. The presuppositions of the
logic are, therefore, to be found in the Phenomenology ; the fundamental
presupposition being that the ultimate reality, the Absolute, is Mind or
Spirit ( Geist )t and as such is not impersonal being, but a living, self-
conscious personality working out his purposes in nature and mind. The
entire universe has its ground in the self-unfolding development of the
Absolute Reason. Basic to the system are the presuppositions: the true
is the whole; the true is concrete, not abstract; the true is a dia-
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1 lectical development, discovered in experience. These are all viewed as
elements in the self-unfolding of the Absolute Reason, and appear at
every stage of the Logic*
(4) The Hegelian categories, unlike those of Aristotle and Kant,
are shown to be logically necessary because all are directly deduced from
the simplest, most abstract, and most fundamental category, Being. The
categories of Aristotle are not characterized by any principle of de-
duction, and the categories of Kant were derived from the traditional
table of judgments and are considered by him to be complete and exhaust-
ive. Hegel looks upon the categories of both as external predicates
applied to reality, and he attempts to deduce his categories in such a
way that they are not merely external limits imposed upon reality, but
are characterizations of reality which are produced by the necessary self-
unfolding of the Absolute Reason. The principle by which this is done is
the principle of dialectic, by which each category is seen to be opposed
to its other, and thought is forced to harmonize the contradictions in a
higher concept. Thought therefore begins with a thesis as opposed to an
antithesis, and these contradictory elements are resolved in a higher
concept, the synthesis, which becomes a new thesis with entirely new prop-
erties and from which the dialectic moves on through a repetition of the
process. Three categories, with their sub-categories, are thus deduced
by Hegel: Being (immediacy), Sssence (external relations), and Concept
(internal relations). Bach is a necessary element in the self-unfolding
of the Absolute Reason. They are not instruments which the mind uses to
interpret reality, but elements of a whole in the unity of which the mind

is * The movement in the Logic is to trace the categories logically in the
abstract up to the category of the Absolute Idea, or self-consciousness.
Thus thought reaches intelligence both as the principle of unity in the
world, and also as the empirical process by means of which that principle
can be traced out in reality,
(5) A comparison of the two logics shows that they are not as
far apart in meaning as is first supposed. Hegelian logic is, however,
much more comprehensive than the logic of Aristotle. Hegel* s primary
objection to syllogistic logic is on the ground that it is inadequate as
an expression of the whole truth. But he does not reject it; he recog-
nizes its value and gives it a high place in his own logic. Hegel himself
makes a beginning by the use of those fundamental laws of thought which he
seems to disparage, and he sees in the syllogism not only the primary
form of subjective reasoning, but also an expression of the nature of
objective reality as well. His concept of the truth as the whole leads
him to emphasize the inadequacy of the older logic, and often makes him
appear to deal with it more harshly than it deserves. Several antitheses
between the two logics are noted:
(a) Syllogistic logic is a logic of class-inclusion based on
similarity including difference. Hegel's is a logic of inclusion based
on similarity and difference included in a higher unity. For both logics
the principle of mediation is basic, the difference between them being in
the method by which mediation is accomplished.
(b) Syllogistic logic is atomistic and analytic, and deals
with external relations. Hegel's logic is organic and synoptic, and med-
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iation involves internal relations characteristic of thought itself,
(c) Both logics are abstract, but both have a reference to
real existence. Their difference lies in a difference of approach,
(d) The two logics differ in their criterion of truth. For
formal logic, consistency is the criterion; for Hegelian logic,
coherence (including consistency) is the criterion, Aristotle's logic is
static and lifeless; Hegel* s logic is organic and dynamic, characterized
by the evolution and development of thought,
(e) The emphasis is Aristotelian logic is upon wholes as
classes; in Hegelian logic the emphasis is upon organic wholes. As such,
it includes reference to the properties of wholes which their parts do
not have - a reference made in formal logic only in connection with the
fallacy of composition and division.
The over-all emphasis of Hegelian logic is upon the principle,
the true is the whole, and the assertion that only a view as comprehensive
as possible can give us the truth about any object.
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